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I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most difficult dilemmas attorneys confront is how to re-
spond after a client has committed unanticipated perjury or fraud' while
1. Perjury is statutorily defined in Missouri: "A person commits the
crime of perjury if, with the purpose to deceive, he knowingly testifies falsely to
any material fact upon oath or affirmation legally administered, in any official
proceeding before any court, public body, notary public or other officer authoriz-
ed to administer oaths." RSMo § 575.040.1 (1978). This definition was adopted
by the new Missouri Criminal Code which took effect January 1, 1979. For opin-
ions by Missouri courts which discuss the definition of perjury, see State v.
Vidauri, 305 S.W.2d 437, 440 (Mo. 1957); State v. Roberson, 543 S.W.2d 817,
820 (Mo. App., D. St. L. 1976).
The federal statutory definition of perjury provides:
Whoever-(1) having taken an oath before a competent tribunal, of-
ficer, or person, in any case in which a law of the United States authorizes
an oath to be administered, that he will testify, declare, depose, or cer-
tify truly, or that any written testimony, declaration, deposition, or cer-
tificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and contrary to such oath
states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to be
true; or
(2) is guilty of perjury and shall, except as otherwise expressly pro-
vided by law, be fined not more than $2,000 or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both. This section is applicable whether the statement
or subscription is made within or without the United States.
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976) (emphasis added).
For an instructive analysis of the reach of the federal statute, see Bronston v.
United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973). For an interesting discussion of the ethical
problems created by client perjury, see Wolfram, Client Perjury, 50 S. CALIF. L.
REV. 809 (1977).
Unlike perjury, the term "fraud" admits of no precise, uniformly applicable
definition. Dean Prosser has observed that the word is "so vague that it requires
definition in nearly every case." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OFTORTS
§ 105, at 684 (4th ed. 1971). See also the discussion of the ambiguity of this term
and some of its common law definitions in Callan & David, Professional Respon-
sibility and the Duty of Confidentiality: Disclosure of Client Misconduct In An
Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 332, 359-60 (1976). While the Callan &
David article is one of the very few that pays significant analytical attention to
fifth amendment problems created by DR 7-102(B)(1), the reliability of their
602 [Vol. 44
2
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/1
1979] CLIENT PERJURY 603
testifying.2 The purposes of this essay are: (1) to explore the values and
responsibilities that are in conflict in this situation; (2) to describe how that
conflict has been resolved in other jurisdictions; and (3) to suggest a course
of conduct for lawyers in Missouri that would do as little damage as possi-
ble to the principles and interests that collide when, on the basis of con-
fidential communications, attorneys conclude that their clients have
perpetrated a testimonial fraud or committed perjury.
In this situation there are three protagonists, each competing for the
attorney's allegiance. First, there are the commandments of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Second, counsel must also consider the obliga-
tions imposed by the law of attorney-client privilege. Finally, there are the
constitutional rights of a client to effective assistance of counsel and to not
be "compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."13
II. THE DILEMMA'S FIRST HORN:
DISCIPLINARY RULE 7-102(B)(1)
A. The Missouri Version of the Rule
The first horn of the dilemma faced by Missouri lawyers who believe
that their client has committed testimonial fraud or perjury stems from the
essay is compromised by some overbroad generalizations and perhaps too hastily
drawn conclusions. See note 5 infra.
For purposes of this article, which is concerned primarily with testimonial
situations (both before and during trial), the term "fraud" should be read as em-
bracing both conduct that satisfies the statutory requirements of perjury and in-
tentionally deceptive material testimony that might not satisfy the technical re-
quirements of perjury, e.g., the defendant's apparently intentionally non-
responsive answers in Bronston v. United States, 409 U.S. 352 (1973).
2. This essay focuses on the problems of testimonial misrepresentation and
not those created by other forms of intentionally deceitful conduct. This article
also will not discuss directly the dilemma counsel faces when he knows in advance
that his client intends to testify falsely. An attorney in that situation, however,
should consider many of the values, policies and rights discussed in this article.
For mote direct confrontations with the issues raised when a client expresses his
intention to lie on the stand, see Ingle v. Fitzharris, 283 F. Supp. 205, 207 (N.D.
Cal. 1968), affd, 411 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1969); McNamara v. State, 502 S.W.2d
306, 308 (Mo. 1973); Allen v. State, 518 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo. App., D. St. L.
1974); Callan & David, supra note 1; Freedman, Professional Responsibility of
the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REv.
1469 (1966); Lefstein, The Criminal Defendant Who Proposes Perjury: Rethink-
ing the Defense Lauyer's Dilemma, 6 HOFSTRA L. REv. 665 (1978); Pye, The
Role of Counsel in the Suppression of Truth, 1978 DUKE L.J. 921, 924 n.17;
Wolfram, supra note 1. See also MO. SuP. CT. R. 4 Disciplinary Rule [hereinafter
cited as Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR] 4-101(C)(3), which expressly permits an attorney
to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime."
3. U.S. CONST. amends. V & VI. See also Mo. CONST. art. 1, § 19 ("no per-
son shall be compelled to testify against himself in a criminal cause"); RSMo§ 491.040 (1978) ("[n]othing in sections 491.010 and 491.030 shall ... be so con-
strued as to compel any person to subject himself, by his testimony, to any pros-
ecution for a criminal offense"). 3
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version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) which the Missouri Supreme
Court has adopted in its Rule 4.4 This Rule commands:
[A Missouri] lawyer who receives information clearly establishing
that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpe-
trated a fraud5 upon a person or tribunal [,to] promptly call
upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses
or is unable to do so, [to] reveal the fraud to the affected per-
son or tribunal.
6
4. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B)(1).
5. The term "fraud" as used here is nowhere defined in Rule 4, supra note
2, or in the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. While Callan &
David, supra note 1, at 358, contend that the term "fraud" in DR 7-102(B)(1)
does not embrace past conduct that "also constitutes a crime," including the
crime of perjury, this narrow interpretation of the reach of the rule is not sus-
tainable. Both the ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
and the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar Administration clearly believe
that the broader term "fraud" was intended to embrace the concept of "perjury"
as a subspecies of a larger classification of misconduct. See ABA COMM. ON
ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as
ABA OPINIONS] No. 341 (1975); ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF THE MISSOURI BAR
ADMINISTRATION, INFORMAL OPINIONS [hereinafter cited as Mo. BAR AD-
VISORY COMMITTEE, INFORMAL OPINION], March 5, 1975, September 10, 1977,
and April 6, 1978. See also Committee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245
N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976); Wolfram, supra note 1, at 820, 864-66.
6. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis added). The form of the
Disciplinary Rule that the ABA currently recommends includes an important
amendment that the Supreme Court of Missouri has not adopted. The ABA's ver-
sion reads:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to
rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall
reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal, except when the in-
formation is protected as privileged communication.
ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(B)(1) (emphasis add-
ed). The underscored last clause was added by the ABA in 1974. See notes 80-86
and accompanying text infra.
The situation in other states varies. States retaining the original 1969 version
of DR 7-102(B)(1) are: Arizona, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico,
Ohio, Oklahoma,Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Wiscon-
sin and Wyoming.
States that have adopted the ABA's amended version of DR 7-102(B)(1) are:
Arkansas, Colorado, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York (substitutes "confidence or secret" for "privileged communication" in
last clause), North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee,
Vermont and West Virginia.
Other states have chosen to adopt rules differing in varying degrees from
either the original or the amended ABA versions. Those states include:
Alabama-Code of Professional Responsibility of the Alabama State
Bar, 293 Ala. XXVII (1975). DR 7-102(B)(1) states:
[Vol. 44604
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A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that...
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall withdraw from employment.
Alaska-That state's rule provides:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that...
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected tribunal and may
reveal the fraud to the affected person.
California -Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of Califor-
nia, CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE, following § 6076 (West Supp. 1978). Rule
7-105(1) states:
In presenting a matter to a tribunal, a member of the State Bar
shall . . . [e]mploy, for the purpose of maintaining the causes
confided to him such means only as are consistent with truth,
and shall not seek to mislead the judge, judicial officer or jury
by an artifice or false statement of fact or law. A member of the
State Bar shall not intentionally misquote to a judge or judicial
officer the language of a book, statute or decision; nor shall he,
with knowledge of its invalidity and without disclosing such
knowledge, cite as authority a decision that has been overruled
or a statute that has been repealed or declared unconstitutional.
A member of the State Bar shall refrain from asserting his per-
sonal knowledge of the facts at issue, except when testifying as a
witness.
District of Columbia-8 D.C. Code Encycl.-Code of Professional
Responsibility (West Supp. 1978). DR 7-102(B)(1) states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that...
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same.
Montana-DR 7-102(B)(1) states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that...
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated
a fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the court.
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE (1977).
North Carolina-4A N.C. GEN. STAT. App. VII (Michie Cum. Supp.
1977). DR 7-102(B)(1) states:
A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that...
[h]is client has, in the course of the representation, committed a
fraud upon a person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his
client to rectify the same, and if the client refuses or is unable to
do so, he shall discontinue his representation of the client in that
matter; and if the representation involves litigation, the lawyer
shall (if applicable rules require) request the tribunal to permit
him to withdraw but without necessarily revealing his reason for
wishing to withdraw.
It must be noted, however, that the above rules are subject to change on short
1979] 605
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While this rule may appear self-explanatory, the full scope of the obliga-
tions it imposes is by no means clear.7 Because the Missouri Supreme Court
has never confronted a case that compelled it to explicate or defend this
rule, the court's view of what Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) requires of at-
torneys remains undetermined.8
Although Missouri appellate courts have not had occasion to define
the reach of this Disciplinary Rule, the Advisory Committee of the
Missouri Bar Administration has published three informal opinions in re-
sponse to questions provoked by Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1).9 In the first
of these opinions, the Advisory Committee considered the following situa-
tion:
What should the defense lawyer do if the defendant tells the lawyer
that he committed the offense for which he is on trial and that case
goes to trial and the client elects to testify and denies he committed
the offense?'0
The Advisory Committee counseled Missouri attorneys who were faced
with this situation to take the following course of action:
The defense attorney should advise the defendant before the client
takes the stand that should any perjured testimony be given by the
client, that the attorney will have to reveal it to the court. If the
notice by supreme court order within the various jurisdictions. Therefore,
although this information is accurate to the best of the author's knowledge, there
may have been some very recent changes in these rules which the above list does
not reflect.
See also ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY BY STATE, (rev. ed. to be published in late Fall,
1979 by the ABA's Center for Professional Discipline, Chicago, Ill.).
7. Other commentators have discussed the ambiguity of several key terms
in this Disciplinary Rule and the failure of the CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY to define their reach. See, e.g., the very helpful annotation of the CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY by Olavi Maru, to be published by the
American Bar Foundation in the Fall of 1979. This author is indebted to Mr.
Maru for sharing his manuscript and for directing attention to several useful
articles concerning the problems that DR 7-102(B)(1) and the SEC are creating
for securities lawyers. See note 19 infra. See also Lowenfels, Expanding Public
Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of the New Trend in Standard
of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 412, 416-17 (1974).
8. Opinions from other jurisdictions also fail to satisfactorily answer this
question. Instructive but inconsistent and incomplete discussions appear in Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (while this
opinion has many implications for interpreting DR 7-102(B)(1), the holding in
the case is premised explicitly on Iowa statutes and not on any portion of the
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY); In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43 (N.D.
1976); In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479 (1976). See also Barnes Freight Line,
Inc. v. ICC, 569 F.2d 912, 922-23 (5th Cir. 1978); Wolfram, supra note 1, at
820-22, 846-47, 854, 864-66.
9. Mo. BAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, INFORMAL OPINIONS of March 5,
1975, September 10, 1977, and April 6, 1978.
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client then takes the stand and does give perjured testimony, the
attorney should request a recess and advise his client that he must
correct his testimony or the lawyer will reveal it to the court.
Counsel should then proceed to follow through with whatever is
necessary. 1
Two and one-half years later12 the Advisory Committee was asked to
reconsider its opinion in light of United States ex rel. Wilcox v.Johnson,' 3
a decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The
Johnson court suggested in dictum that "an attorney may not volunteer a
mere unsubstantiated opinion that his client's protestations of innocence
are perjured."'1 4 In reaffirming the position it took in its earlier opinion,
the Advisory Committee emphasized that:
The Wilcox case is based upon counsel's private conjectures
about the guilt or innocence of his client which differs materially
from the direct admissions of guilt from the client which the Ad-
visory Committee considered in rendering its March 5, 1975, in-
formal opinion.' 5
B. Limitation on the Reach of the Rule
This response by the Advisory Committee highlights one very impor-
tant aspect of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B): under that rule an attorney ac-
11. Id.
12. MO. BAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, INFORMAL OPINION of September 10,
1977.
13. 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
14. Id. at 122.
15. Mo. BAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, INFORMAL OPINION of September 10,
1977. The Commentary to § 7.7 (testimony by the defendant) in the 1971 Supple-
ment to the Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense
Function (published by the American Bar Association's Project on Standards for
Criminal Justice) contains a bold and arresting declaration which does not seem
to have been embraced by courts and commentators. The Commentary states,
without explanation or elaboration, that "[i]t should be noted that DR 7-102(B),
which requires a lawyer to reveal a 'fraud' perpetrated by his client on a tribunal,
is construed as not embracing the giving of false testimony in a criminal case."
Supp. at 18. The Commentary cites no authority for this interpretation of the
Disciplinary Rule; nor is there anything in the language of the Rule that would
appear to offer even the faintest support for this view. (The ABA House of
Delegates recently has reconsidered the situation discussed in § 7.7. The only con-
sensus reached was to defer thorough reexamination of the issues surrounding this
subsection until after completion of the ABA's current systematic reexamination
of the entire Code of Professional Responsibility.)
The informal opinions by the Advisory Committee of the Missouri Bar Ad-
ministration that are discussed in the text clearly are premised on the assumption
that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) applies to both civil and criminal matters. That
assumption seems supported by common sense (if the drafters of the Rule had in-
tended it not to apply in criminal cases they could easily have said so, but they did
not) and, as Professor Wolfram points out, by "a long history of the predecessor
Canons [29 and 41] and their interpretations in many ethics committee opin-
ions." Wolfram, Client Perury, supra note 1, at n.225.
1979] 607
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quires no ethical obligation to disclose anything unless she "receives infor-
mation clearly establishing"'6 the fraud by the client. As Wilcox and the
Advisory Committee's second informal opinion emphasize, an attorney
would be violating professionally compulsory loyalties to his client 17 if he
took any action that might be detrimental to the client without first receiv-
ing information "clearly establishing" the client's wrongdoing.
1. What Level of Certainty is Required?
No Missouri court has defined the level of certainty required by the
phrase "clearly establishing" in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B). Nor do opin-
ions from other jurisdictions provide reliable guidance for resolving this
question."8 Several factors suggest, however, that information that leaves
counsel with any significant doubt cannot be considered to "clearly estab-
lish" the wrongdoing of the client. 19 Ethical Consideration 7-3 explicitly
directs "a lawyer [, while serving as an advocate, to] resolve in favor of his
client doubts as to the bounds of the law." 20 Reflection about the suspect-
ing attorney's situation reinforces this ethical directive. Because the con-
duct by the client (which Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) would require an
attorney to disclose) frequently would constitute a crime-perjury or
perhaps criminal fraud2'- and because making the disclosure is likely to
severely damage a client's interests (e.g., by leading to prosecution for an
additional crime and, if a mistrial is declared, forcing the client to
undergo a second trial on the original charge), it seems fair to assume that
counsel should not reach a conclusion that would force him to turn against
his client and disclose alleged misconduct unless he is convinced at least
16. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B) (emphasis added).
17. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4. Canons 7 & 4.
18. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 812 n.10; Callan & David, supra note 1,
at 332-33.
19. Other commentators, focusing primarily on problems confronted by
securities lawyers, also have argued that no duty to disclose should arise if counsel
is not convinced that the client has committed illegal acts. See, e.g., ABA Com-
mittee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Prac-
tice, 30 Bus. LAW. 1289, 1297-98 (1975); Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police
Force: A New Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 437, 456 (1974); Myers,
The Attorney-Client Relationship and the Code of Professional
Responsibility: Suggested Attorney Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose
Fraud to Securities and Exchange Commission, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 1113,
1128-30 (1976).
20. Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, Ethical Consideration [hereinafter cited as Mo. SUP.
CT. R. 4, EC] 7-3; ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Ethical Con-
sideration [hereinafter cited as ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
EC] 7-3.
21. For a discussion of the definition of perjury in Missouri, see note 1 supra.
For Missouri statutory definitions of criminal conduct which could include
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beyond a reasonable doubt that the client has committed fraud or per-
jury. 22
Moreover, because of the unique character of the relationship between
attorney and client, a strong argument can be made that the level of cer-
tainty of wrongdoing an advocate should reach before revealing the
client's alleged wrongs is even higher than the level of certainty required of
the trier of fact in a criminal proceeding. The trier of fact has an entirely
different relationship with the accused than does the advocate/counselor
and performs a very different function in the system of justice. Unlike the
trier of fact, the attorney is charged with a unique form of loyalty23 to his
client and a special responsibility to earn and maintain his client's trust.24
These obligations are based on a societal judgment that it is highly unfair
to force an accused person to face the powerful machinery of our adjudi-
catory system without the full support of an attorney who understands its
processes and is capable of doing battle within it on equal terms with the
representatives of the state. The relationship between client and attorney
that our system promotes is thus more than fiduciary; it also involves an
acutely personal form of dependence. Great violence would be done to
that relationship and the values it reflects if clients could not be confident
that their lawyer would not turn against them unless their wrongdoings
were completely indisputable.
2. Does Counsel Have a Duty to Investigate Suspect
Testimony by His Client?
The phrasing of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) suggests another poten-
tially significant limitation on its reach. The Rule implies that attorneys
are passive participants in the process that creates the obligation. The at-
torney the Rule describes is one "who receives information clearly estab-
lishing" the fraud.2 5 This construction of the Rule provokes an additional
question: Is an attorney obligated to make inquiries or to conduct investi-
gations to determine whether or not her client has committed fraud or per-
jury? Because neither the appellate courts of Missouri nor the Advisory
Committee have addressed this question, 26 guidance to its answer must be
22. Requiring at least this level of certainty seems appropriate even though
the attorney's revelations would not, of course, formally convict his client of any
crime. Cf. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 122 (3d Cir.
1977). The attorney-client privilege probably would bar use of the attorney's
disclosures as evidence in a subsequent perjury prosection. But see discussion of
the possible role of the concept of "continuing crime" on the inapplicability of the
privilege, notes 68-80 and accompanying text infra.
23. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, Canon 7.
24. Id., Canons 4 & 9.
25. Mo. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B).
26. Professor Wolfram addressed this question in the following fashion:
The attorney should not be able to evade the responsibility of correcting
false testimony by wilfully remaining ignorant where known facts call for
further investigation. So long as the clues compellingly suggest possible 9
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sought elsewhere. While there is some authority supporting the proposi-
tion that an attorney has a duty to conduct an investigation into the truth-
fulness of testimony already given by her client, the arguments in support
of the conclusion that no such duty exists are substantially more per-
suasive.
Professor Wolfram 27 offers significant support for the view that an at-
torney does have an obligation to investigate the truthfulness of his client's
testimony in at least some circumstances. 28 Wolfram argues that:
The attorney should not be able to evade the responsibility of cor-
recting false testimony by wilfully remaining ignorant where
serious falsity, an attorney should be under a responsibility to conduct
such further investigation as an attorney desiring to protect the interest
of a client would conduct under similar circumstances. ["Cf. Florida Bar
v. McCaghren, 171 So. 2d 371, 372 (Fla. 1965) (suspension of attorney
who failed to make inquiry during divorce proceedings of suspicious cir-
cumstances surrounding divorce client's gathering of evidence of op-
posite spouse's adultery); People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Beattie, 137 Ill.
553, 576, 27 N.E. 1096, 1103 (1891) (disbarment of attorney after ex
parte divorce case marked with client's perjury; the attorney "either
actively assisted her, or purposely shut his eyes to what she was doing");
State v. Zwillman, 112 NJ. Super. 6, 16, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (1970) ("It is
not an attorney's responsibility to decide the truth or falsity of a client's
representations unless he has actual knowledge or unless from facts
within his personal knowledge or his professional experience he should
know or reasonably suspect that the client's representations are false"). It
would seem required by minimal standards of attorney competence to
conduct such investigation as is necessary to determine the extent to
which cross-examination or other impeachment of a client's intended
testimony would effectively rebut the testimony."'Wolfram, supra note
1, at 843 n.126]. Where the claimed failure to know is obviously the pro-
duct of negligence, this will often rather strongly indicate a guilty mind.
Practice such as informing the client about the kind of testimony that
would be required in order to produce evidence for a favorable argu-
ment in litigation, when it is known that the client will employ the legal
advice to commit perjury, is of course a more obvious example of know-
ing participation in perjury.
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 843. As the discussion in the text makes clear, this
author believes Professor Wolfram has overstated counsel's obligation to monitor
and investigate possible client misconduct.
27. Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
28. Wolfram, supra note 1. Some additional support for the view that in
certain circumstances DR 7-102(B)(1) may create limited duties to investigate the
representations made by clients is offered by one faction of the commentators.
This faction is concerned about the arguably unique roles played by counsel in
connection with offerings of securities. See, e.g., Johnson, The Dynamics of SEC
Rule 2(e): A Crisis for the Bar, 1975 UTAH L. REV. 629, 647; Marquis, AnAp-
praisal of Attorneys' Responsibilities Before Administrative Agencies, 26 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 285, 290 (1976). Other commentators concerned about the same
problem appear to believe that an attorney acquires no obligations under the rule
until after he receives (without conducting a special investigation) sufficient in-
formation to dissolve all real doubts about the client's conduct. See authorities
cited note 19 supra.
61,0 [Vol. 44
10
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/1
1979] CLIENT PERJURY 611
known facts call for further investigation. So long as the clues com-
pellingly suggest possible serious falsity, an attorney should be
under a responsibility to conduct such further investigation as an
attorney desiring to protect the interest of a client would conduct
under similar circumstances. 29
There are several difficulties present in Wolfram's position. The first
derives from the logical precariousness and practical unmanageability of
his description of the conditions that trigger the duty to investigate. He
maintains that the duty arises when "clues compellingly suggest possible
serious falsity." There is a formidable tension between the words "clues,"
"suggest," and "possible" on the one hand, and the term "compellingly"
on the other. This logical tension creates considerable ambiguity in the
standard offered by Wolfram. That ambiguity would not only make it dif-
ficult for practicing lawyers to determine when they incur an investigatory
duty, but also would lead different attorneys to fix that point in different
places.
. A second, and more important, difficulty with Wolfram's position is
his failure to lay a proper foundation for the duty he would impose. He ap-
pears to premise the duty to investigate the accuracy of a client's testimony
upon counsel's obligation "to protect the interest of a client. '30 Wolfram
insists that "[i]t would seem required by minimal standards of attorney
competence to conduct such investigation as is necessary to determine the
extent to which cross-examination or other impeachment of a client's in-
tended testimony would effectively rebut the testimony. 3 1 At the heart of
the duties which Wolfram refers to are the commitments of loyalty and ser-
vice to clients that are so fundamental to our system of justice. It would
distort those commitments to use the duties they create as premises for an
attorney's obligation to turn on a client by conducting an active investiga-
tion into his honesty. Moreover, there frequently would be important dif-
ferences between investigations based on a desire to serve a client's inter-
ests well and investigations designed to determine the accuracy of a client's
testimony. Obviously, the purpose of an investigation can determine
whether it occurs at all as well as what it covers. While it often would be
necessary to conduct investigations before a client testified in order to
prepare for cross-examination, after a client has testified the obligation to
serve him well frequently would provoke no need for any investigation at
all. Furthermore, an attorney whose purpose is to protect his client would
not always pursue the same leads or explore the same matters as would an
attorney whose purpose was to judge his client's veracity. For example,
while an attorney whose purpose was to protect his client would be con-
cerned primarily about the admissibility of damaging evidence, an
29. Wolfram, supra note 1, at 843.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 843 n.126. 11
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attorney whose purpose was to evaluate his client's truthfulness would be
concerned primarily with the existence of such evidence.
Because the duties of competence and loyalty to one's client cannot
support an obligation to pursue suspicions about a client's veracity, if
Wolfram's view is to be accepted it must be upon some other basis. The
only other authority he offers consists of three judicial opinions, two of
which were issued before the Code of Professional Responsibility
existed.32 More significantly, only the shortest and least developed of these
three opinions clearly supports his position. In a one and one-half page
opinion,33 the Florida Supreme Court held that an. attorney "should have
made inquiry of his client concerning the suspicious circumstances" after
there appeared "at several stages of the divorce proceedings ... red flags
which bore the indicia of his client's improper conduct. '34 The per-
suasiveness of this conclusion is seriously compromised by its summary
presentation, by the lack of a logical argument by the court justifying it,
and by the absence of citation to even a single supporting authority.
The other two cases cited by Wolfram serve even less well in his effort
to establish authority for a duty to investigate a client's veracity. In an 1891
Illinois case, 35 an attorney was disbarred for intentionally presenting and
capitalizing on testimony he knew in advance to be false. While the court
alluded in dictum to the possibility that the attorney had purposely shut
his eyes to possible misconduct by a client, the court's decision clearly
rested on the attorney's knowing and intentional effort to defraud the trial
court. Nowhere in the opinion is there any reference to a duty to investi-
gate possibly disingenuous testimony by a client.
Professor Wolfram also cites State v. Zwillman, 3 6 a 1970 opinion by the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of NewJersey. In the only portion
of Zwillman that is arguably relevant here, the court concluded that a trial
judge had prejudiced the rights of an attorney-defendant in a criminal'
prosecution by not answering the following question, posed by the jury
during its deliberations: "Is it a lawyer's responsibility to determine the
truthfulness of a claim in a negligence case or does his responsibility lie in
only representing his client to the best of his knowledge?" 37 The Zwillman
court's effort to answer this question is not itself free from ambiguity.3 8
32. The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted by the House of
Delegates of the American Bar Association in August 1969 and became effective
January 1, 1970. American Bar Association, Code of Professional Responsibility
and Code of Judicial Conduct, Preface (as amended August 1978).
33. Florida Bar v. McCaghren, 171 So. 2d 371 (Fla. 1965).
34. Id. at 372.
35. People ex rel. Attorney Gen. v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 27 N.E. 1096
(1891).
36. State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 270 A.2d 284 (1970).
37. Id. at 15, 270 A.2d at 288.
38. The ambiguous sentence in the opinion, quoted by Wolfram, supra
note 1, at 843 n.126, reads: "It is not an attorney's responsibility to decide the
612 [Vol. 44
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The impression its answer creates is that an attorney has no obligations
with respect to a client's veracity unless counsel already has received infor-
mation from which he knows or should know that the client presented false
testimony. The primary source of this impression is the Zwillman court's
emphasis on Ethical Consideration 7-26 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, 39 which the court quoted in full and with obvious ap-
proval. 40 This Ethical Consideration addresses the attorney who must
decide before putting his client on the stand whether the client's proposed
testimony would be false. After declaring that counsel "who knowingly
participates in introduction of such [false] testimony or evidence is subject
to discipline," Ethical Consideration 7-26 proceeds to point out that: "A
lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence his client desires
to have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge
should know, that such testimony or evidence is false, fraudulent, or per-
jured.41
Ethical Consideration 7-26 makes no reference to suspicions (however
strong) or to duties to investigate the credibility of one's own client. The
obligation it imposes to not present certain evidence arises only if the infor-
mation counsel already has acquired, in the normal course of the represen-
tation, is such that he knows or should know that the evidence would be
false. Thus, while Ethical Consideration 7-26 prohibits counsel from in-
tentionally ignoring information he already possesses, it also clearly im-
plies that an attorney has no affirmative duty to launch an investigation for
the purpose of verifying his client's proposed testimony.
This aspect of Ethical Consideration 7-26 reinforces the conclusion
which the structure of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) compels. It would be
unreasonable to assume that the lawyers who carefully drafted this Rule
for the ABA were not well aware of its language and structure. The
drafters of this Rule must have intended that an attorney incur no obliga-
tion to make disclosure. or to take any other action adverse to her client
truth or falsity of a client's representations unless he has actual knowledge or
unless from facts within his personal knowledge or his professional experience he
should know or reasonably suspect that the client's representations are false." The
sentence immediately following this one appears to remove the ambiguity by
declaring that "[t]he duty of the attorney is to seek for his client all that the client
is entitled to under the law and not to act in the first instance as judge and jury."
112 N.J. Super. at 16, 270 A.2d at 289.
Additional support for the view that the Zwillman court did not intend to
obligate attorneys to conduct investigations of clients based on mere suspicions
derives from the court's substantial reliance on the ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-26. See notes 39-41 and accompanying text infra.
39. Missouri's Ethical Consideration 7-26 is identical to the ABA version.
Compare Mo. Sup. CT. R. 4, EC 1-26 with ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY, EC 7-26.
40. 112 N.J. Super. at 16, 270 A.2d at 289.
41. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 7-26 (emphasis add-
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unless the information she has already received clearly establishes the
client's wrongdoing. The phrasing of the Rule thus belies any intention to
require counsel to take affirmative steps to verify the truthfulness of
testimony already given by her client.
A close look at the role of counsel and her relationship to her client
reinforces this conclusion. An attorney in civil litigation is not an agent of
adverse parties; defense counsel in a criminal matter is not an arm of the
prosecution. Lawyers are not to perform the functions of judges or jurors.
Instead, they are advocates whose primary responsibility is to pursue their
clients' interests as vigorously as possible within the bounds of the law. 42 To
compel attorneys to monitor their clients' behavior, to pursue vigorously
any suspicions that might occur to them about possible wrongdoing by
their clients, and to develop evidence against the people they represent,
would undermine the fundamental character of the attorney-client rela-
tionship and bastardize the role of defense counsel. Imposing such obliga-
tions on attorneys also would create pressure on clients to conceal informa-
tion from their lawyers and to try to make the tactical judgments about the
use of evidence that only attorneys are fully equipped to make. It seems
unlikely that courts would impose duties on counsel that would have such
negative effects. It follows that attorneys should interpret Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B)(1) as imposing upon them no obligation at all until after a
suspicion that a client might have committed fraud or perjury has been
converted into an undeniable conclusion by information counsel has ac-
quired in the normal course of the representation and without actively in-
vestigating her client's credibility. 43
3. What Constitutes "Fraudulent" Testimony for Purposes
of the Rule?
There is another important ambiguity lurking beneath the surface of
the apparently clear language of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). The Rule
fails to define precisely what it is that counsel's information must "clearly"
establish. By its own language the Rule imposes duties on the attorney only
when the client "has... perpetrated a fraud." Unfortunately, the Code of
Professional Responsibility does not even attempt to define the crucial
term "fraud." Without such a definition, attorneys are left to guess what
the elements are of the wrongdoing they are supposed to police. Commen-
tators4 4 and ethics committees45 appear to have made the reasonable
assumption that the kind of "fraud" which Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1)
was intended to reach has three essential elements: (1) the client's repre-
sentation or conduct must create a false impression; (2) that impression
42. MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, Canon 7.
43. Cf. United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977).
44. See Callan & David, supra note 1, at 359 & n.120.
45. See ABA OPINION 341; Mo. BAR ADVISORY COMMITTEE, INFORMAL
OPINIONS of March 5, 1975, September 10, 1977, andApril 6, 1978. See also the
court's discussion of OREGON STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPI-
NION 277 (1972) in In re A, 276 Or. 225, 239-40, 554 P.2d 479, 486-87 (1976).
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must be material; and most importantly, (3) the client must have intended
to create that material misconception. Before the Disciplinary Rule can
come into play at all, then, an attorney must reach a firm conclusion not
only about the falsity and materiality of his client's testimony, but also
about something much more elusive and much more difficult to "clearly"
establish: the subjective intentions behind his client's conduct.
Despite the limitations on the reach of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) that
derive from the requirement that counsel take no action against her
client's interests until she already has received information "clearly estab-
lishing" the client's "fraud," there will be occasions when attorneys will be
certain that the testimony their client has given is perjurious or fraudulent.
The most obvious case would be when the client frankly admits that he lied
on the stand. In such cases, if the client refuses (or is unable) to rectify the
fraud, the Missouri version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) commands
counsel to "reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal."'4 6 Before
attempting to define what information counsel would have to disclose
under this directive, it is important to determine whether there are other
rules of law or rights of clients that counsel who comply with this discipli-
nary rule might be in danger of violating.
III. THE DILEMMA'S SECOND HORN:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
The most obvious obligations that disclosure of a client's fraud or per-
jury might violate are based on the attorney-client privilege. Through the
oath that attorneys must take on admission to the Missouri bar, the
Missouri Supreme Court compels lawyers to promise "to maintain the con-
fidence and preserve inviolate the secrets" of their clients. 47 In Ethical
Consideration 4-4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility the court also
commands Missouri attorneys to "endeavor to act in a manner which pre-
serves the evidentiary privilege . . . [and] timely to assert the privilege
unless it is waived by the client." 48 In order to determine whether there
could be a conflict between these general commandments and the specific
directive of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), it is necessary to ascertain
whether the attorney-client privilege would apply in Missouri to an attor-
ney who felt obligated by the disciplinary rule to disclose testimonial fraud
his client had perpetrated. To answer this question it will be necessary to
examine legal authority both from Missouri and from other jurisdictions.
A. Does the Privilege Embrace the Disclosure
Contemplated in DR 7-102(B)(1)?
Opinions by the Missouri Supreme Court have made it clear that Mo.
Rev. Stat. section 491.060, which declares that an attorney is "incompetent
46. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B)(1).
47. MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.11.
48. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, EC 4-4.
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to testify ... concerning any communication made to him by his client
in that relation, or his advice thereon, without the consent of such cli-
ent," 49 simply adopts the common law of attorney-client privilege50 and
does not limit its scope. While decisions by Missouri courts have not estab-
lished the outermost bounds of the reach of the attorney-client privilege,
they have made it clear that the privilege can apply to non-testimonial
situations. For example, in State ex rel. Cain v. Barker, 'I the Missouri
Supreme Court held that written statements given by an insured to a repre-
sentative of his insurer were protected by the attorney-client privilege and
therefore did not have to be produced in pretrial discovery proceedings.52
Even more recently, in State ex reL Great American Insurance Co. v.
Smith,5 3 the Missouri Supreme Court held that letters from an attorney to
his client that consisted of opinion and advice were covered by the privi-
lege, were not discoverable, and could not be inspected in camera by the
trial court. 4
While the holding in Smith is instructive, the court's extended discus-
sion of the rationale of the attorney-client privilege is even more signifi-
cant. In that discussion, the supreme court unequivocally endorsed a view
of the privilege that gives it a very broad reach and elevates it to a high
place among the values that our adjudicatory system serves.55 Judge
Finch's opinion for the majority 6 openly acknowledged that within the
American legal community there are "two prevailing views as to the scope
of the attorney-client privilege. '57 He recognized that the difference be-
tween these views is based on a different ordering of the importance of
"two different fundamental policies."55 Those two "fundamental policies"
are (1) the "societal need to have all evidence having rational probative
value placed before the trier of facts in a lawsuit" and (2) the "societal need
for confidentiality" of communications between attorney and client. 59
Dean Wignore, the most influential scholarly proponent of the nar-
rower view of the scope of the privilege, believed that the policy of
disclosure was more important than the policy of confidentiality. He
therefore argued that the attorney-client privilege should be considered
49. RSMo § 491.060 (1978).
50. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d 379, 382 (Mo.
1978).
51. 540 S.W.2d 50 (Mo. 1976).
52. Id. at 53.
53. 574 S.W.2d 379 (Mo. 1978).
54. Id. at 387.
55. For a very broad reading of the scope of the attorney-client privilege by
the Missouri Supreme Court long before the Smith case, see State v. Dawson, 90
Mo. 149, 155, 1 S.W. 827, 829 (Mo. 1886).
56. Judges Seiler and Donnelly dissented in separate opinions. State ex reL.
Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d at 387.
57. Id. at 382.
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only an exception to a more fundamental rule and should be "strictly con-
fined within the narrowest possible limits consistent with the logic of its
principle. "60
In contrast, proponents of the broader interpretation of the privilege6'
"view confidentiality of communications between attorney and client as
the more fundamental policy, to which disclosure is the exception. 62 The
only such exception acknowledged under this view is "a very limited privi-
lege of disclosure" which the rules of professional responsibility create
when a client announces in advance his intention to commit a crime.63
Neither Judge Finch nor the proponents of the broader view of the privi-
lege whom he cited in Smith discussed the possibility that fraud or perjury
committed by a client in the past might create an additional exception to
the general rule against disclosure. Although the Smith opinion does not
disclose how the Missouri Supreme Court would resolve a direct conflict
between the evidentiary privilege and the commandment in Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B)(1) to reveal frauds by clients, it leaves no doubt about which
view of the scope of the attorney-client privilege the court has adopted for
Missouri. Openly embracing the broader view, the court stated:
[C]onfidentiality of the communications between client and at-
torney is essential for such relationships to be fostered and to be ef-
fective .... The nature and complexity of our present system ofjustice and the relationships among people and between the peo-
ple and their government make the preservation and protection of
the attorney-client privilege even more essential. If this is to be ac-
complished, when one undertakes to confer in confidence with an
attorney whom he employs in connection with the particular mat-
ter at hand, it is vital that all of what the client says to the lawyer
and what the lawyer says to the client ... be treated as confidential
and protected by the attorney-client privilege. This is what a client
expects. 64
The Smith court therefore decided that the values supporting "confiden-
tiality of communications between attorney and client" are more funda-
mental in the adversary system of adjudication than the values supporting
60. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291, at 554 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
61. In explicating this second view, Judge Finch relied heavily on an article
that was co-authored in 1963 byJosephJ. Simeone, later a judge on the Missouri
Supreme Court. See Sedler & Simeone, Priileges in the Law of Evidence: The
Realities of Attorney-Client Confidences, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1963). Another
proponent of the broader view who Judge Finch cited was the late David W.
Louisell. See Louisell, Confidentiality, Conformity and Confusion: Priilege in
Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101 (1956). Both the Sedler & Simeone ar-
ticle and the Louisell essay were cited by Judge Finch in the Smith case. 574
S.W.2d at 383.
62. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d at 383.
63. Id. See also Sedler & Simeone, supra note 61, at 41-44.
64. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d at 383-84.
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disclosure and, accordingly, that the law in this state should reflect a
strong presumption in favor of protecting confidences.
The Missouri Supreme Court's adoption of such an expansive view of
the scope of the attorney-client privilege- refusing to confine its applica-
tion to testimonial situations-makes it clear (absent the rules of profes-
sional responsibility) that if an attorney learns in confidence from her
client that the client had committed fraud or perjury, the attorney-client
privilege prevents her from revealing the misconduct "to the affected per-
son or tribunal." 65
Authority from other jurisdictions supports the conclusion that even
though the disclosure required by the Disciplinary Rule does not constitute
"testimony," this fact would not prevent the privilege from applying to
such revelations. Section 955 of the California Evidence Code, for exam-
ple, explicitly requires an attorney "who received or made a communica-
tion subject to the privilege" to assert the privilege on behalf of his client
"whenever he is present when the communication is sought to be dis-
closed."6 Professor Wigmore, in summarizing the common law elements
of the privilege, similarly asserted that the confidential communications
from client to attorney are "permanently protected" if they otherwise
qualify for protection by the privilege. 67
B. Does the Concept of "Continuing Crime" Leave Communications
About Testimonial Fraud Unprotected by the Privilege?
There remains one other potentially significant issue the resolution of
which could affect whether the attorney-client privilege applies in the
situation contemplated in Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). One of the most
important and widely-recognized exceptions to the attorney-client privi-
lege is the rule that no protection can attach to communications that are
made for the purpose of seeking assistance in the commission of a future or
continuing crime. 68 Unfortunately, "neither logic nor judicial precedent
65. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4 DR 7-102(B)(1).
66. CAL. EVID. CODE § 955 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
67. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (MeNaughton rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis
added).
68. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 312 Mo. 510, 522, 279 S.W. 411, 414 (1925);
Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W. 677, 679 (1920); Jafarian-Kerman v.
Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 338-40 (K.C. Mo. App. 1967). But see United
States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006, 1011 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S.
943 (1974); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United States Auto. Ass'n v. Werley, 526 P.2d 28,
31-33 (Alas. 1974); Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 682-85, 211
S.W. 441,443-44 (1919); State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d
379, 383 (Mo. 1978); In re Selser, 15 N.J. 393, 402-10, 105 A.2d 395, 399-404
(1954). See also Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062-67 (1978); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 2298-99 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 26
(1953); MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 211 (1942); Committee on Rules of Prac-
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has set any definite boundary to this aspect of the privilege. Moreover,
though the privilege ceases for advice as to future wrongdoing (as con-
trasted with past acts), this line of distinction varies with different transac-
tions. '69 Another important question is whether testimonial fraud or
perjury, once committed, should be categorized as past misconduct or
"present, continuing illegality." 0 Cases from Missouri and other jurisdic-
tions offer no clear answer to this question. 7 1 Nor can a reliable answer be
constructed from clues that might be found in the status of the doctrine of
recantation. One reason that doctrine can offer no firm guidance is that
there is no consensus as to its meaning. The federal law remains that per-
jury is a completed crime as soon as materially false statements are inten-
tionally given under oath and that a perjurer has no power to erase his
crime by recanting (correcting his false testimony), regardless of how
promptly he does so or whether his misconduct has been detected by
others.72
The rule in some states, in contrast, is that recantation made during
the proceeding in which the false testimony was made and before its falsity
is otherwise disclosed can serve as a complete defense to a perjury charge.7
In Missouri, the legislature has resolved the tension between incompatible
and judicially unreconciled supreme court precedents, the older of which
rejected recantation as a defense 74 and the more recent of which appeared
to acknowledge it 75 by declaring that timely retraction of false testimony is
a complete defense in a perjury prosecution.7 6
tice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, PROPOSED
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE rule 503, 51 F.R.D. 315 (1971).
69. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2299, at 578 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
70. United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 958 (1971).
71. But see McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967)
("perjury [is] . . . in effect a continuing [offense] so long as allowed to remain in
the record to influence the jury's verdict").
72. United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937). See also Annot., 64
A.L.R.2d 276, 284-88 (1959). Under the federal rule, recantation can do no
more than serve as evidence that the false testimony was not inspired by the re-
quired criminal intent. See United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574 (1937);
People v. Hamby, 6 Ill. 2d 559, 129 N.E.2d 746 (1955).
73. See, e.g., People v. Ezangi, 2 N.Y.2d 439, 141 N.E.2d 580, 161 N.Y.S.2d
75 (1957). But see Black v. State, 13 Ga. App. 541, 542, 79 S.E. 173, 174 (1913)
(implying that the crime of perjury is completed and wholly beyond the power of
the perpetrator to rectify as soon as the intentionally false testimony is given).
74. Martin v. Miller, 4 Mo. 47 (1835).
75. State v. Brinkley, 354 Mo. 337, 189 S.W.2d 314 (1945) (the opinion fails
to mention the contrary position taken in Martin, supra note 74).
76. This legislation provides:
It is a defense to a prosecution under subsection 1 of this section that
the actor retracted the false statement in the course of the official pro-
ceeding in which it was made provided he did so before the falsity of the
statement was exposed. Statements made in separate hearings at
separate stages of the same proceedings, including but not limited to
statements made before a grand jury, at a preliminary hearing, at a 19
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The existence of the recantation defense in states like Missouri at first
glance appears to support the view that unrectified perjury or testimonial
fraud should be considered a crime that continues at least until the pro-
ceeding in which it occurred is terminated and, thereby, the opportunity
to void the offense is foreclosed. There are several difficulties, however,
with attempting to determine whether or not the privilege should apply by
so defining the duration of the offense. One such difficulty derives from
the fact that Missouri law has not made clear what role, if any, recantation
might play as a defense to fraud that does not rise to the level of perjury but
which would trigger the obligations of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). Nor
are there clear guidelines for distinguishing between fraud that exposes a
client to criminal penalties and fraud that is subject only to civil redress.
The uncertainty that pervades this area of the law would make it imprac-
tical and unfair to demand that clients and attorneys use the doctrine of
recantation to determine whether given misrepresentations would be con-
sidered as either "continuing" or as "past" misconduct.
Moreover, such difficulties represent only the tip of the iceberg of il-
logic and impracticality into which efforts to fix the scope of the attorney-
client privilege by categorizing offenses as "past" or "continuing" would
crash. The Aristotelian conceptual tidiness that categorizing different
kinds of conduct would appear to offer is itself a simplistic deception.
Reality has a way of wreaking havoc with rigidly formalistic approaches.
The greatest difficulty with trying to categorize different types of miscon-
duct as either "continuing" or as "past" derives from the fact that there
are very few kinds of misconduct whose'effects do not in a very real sense
"6continue" well after the acts which constitute the misconduct have been
completed. The effects of a murder, for example, may persist through
generations. Similarly, the effects of a robbery of a bank clearly continue
until the stolen money is returned and, in more subtle ways, may continue
for much longer periods through lost opportunities to invest the stolen
funds, in lost customer confidence in the bank as a safe repository of funds,
in higher insurance premiums, and in countless other ways. Despite the
fact that the evil effects of murders and bank robberies may persist
through long periods, neither of these types of misconduct is considered a
''continuing" crime in the sense that confidential communications from
client to attorney about the misconduct are deemed outside the protection
of the attorney-client privilege." This appears to be true even when the in-
formation the attorney receives from his client could help remedy the con-
sequences of the crime, e.g., it is not at all clear that an attorney whose
deposition or at a previous trial, are made in the course of the same pro-
ceedings.
RSMO § 575.040 (1978).
77. See, e.g., State v. Dawson, 90 Mo. 149, 1 S.W. 827 (1886); State ex rel.
Sowers v. Qlwell, 64 Wash. 2d 828, 394 P.2d 681 (1964); State v. Sullivan, 60
Wash. 2d 214, 383 P.2d 474 (1962); State v. Douglas, 20 W. Va. 770 (1882).
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client gives him clues as to the whereabouts of the fruits of a robbery is
obligated to disclose those clues to the police. If communications from
clients that could help remedy the most obvious ill-effects of bank rob-
beries are protected by the attorney-client privilege, it is difficult to under-
stand why communications from clients that could help remedy the effects
of fraud or perjury are not so protected. If there is a principle that would
distinguish these situations and would make it reasonable to apply dif-
ferent rules to them, that principle is hardly obvious.
There are yet other dimensions of arbitrariness that would accompany
basing the availability of the attorney-client privilege on an effort to cate-
gorize fraud or perjury either as "past" or as "continuing" misconduct.
That arbitrariness inheres in the difficulty of defining when, if ever, per-
jury is to be considered a "completed" crime. If the doctrine of recantation
is used as the basis for deciding the question then, at least in jurisdictions
like Missouri where recantation can void the offense, "perjury" would
become a completed and, therefore, past crime as soon as the proceeding
in which it has been committed was terminated. One question this line of
reasoning provokes is why the availability of recantation should determine
whether or not the crime is "continuing." Clearly the ill-effects of perjury
can persist well after the proceeding is completed; the consequences of a
judgment obtained unjustly through perjury may endure for a very long
time indeed. Further, some of those effects might be remedied if the per-
jury were disclosed and a new trial were ordered.78 Neither is it clear why
the privilege should attach to communications about perjury that was
committed in a proceeding that was terminated five minutes earlier, but
should not attach to such communications if they are made immediately
before judgment is entered.
One additional difficulty with the approach that would condition the
availability of the privilege on the status of the misconduct as "past" or
"continuing" warrants mention. Technically, under this approach, not all
communications with respect to "continuing illegality" are unprotected by
the privilege; instead, the only communications that are subject to dis-
closure over the client's objection are those made with "the purpose... to
further" future intended or present continuing illegality. 79
This qualification compounds the impracticality of this approach by
requiring counsel to go through another exercise in categorization before
deciding whether the privilege attaches to communications. An attorney
operating under these formalistic rules could disclose no communications
from his client unless he concluded both that the subject of the
78. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 814 & n.17.
79. United States v. Goldenstein, 456 F.2d 1006 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 943 (1974); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); Gebhardt v. United Rys., 220 S.W. 677,
679 (Mo. 1920); Jafarian-Kerman v. Jafarian-Kerman, 424 S.W.2d 333, 338-39
(K.C. Mo. App. 1967).
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communications was a "continuing" crime and that his client made the
communication for the purpose of securing aid in furtherance of that
crime. To ask counsel to pass judgment on the subjective purposes which
motivated his client's communications to him not only would impose an
unrealistic burden on attorneys but also would threaten the fiduciary
nature of the attorney-client relationship. It is worth noting, moreover,
that even under this heavily formalistic reasoning, a client's confession to
his attorney of perjury would remain protected by the attorney-client
privilege, even if the misconduct were categorized as "continuing," as long
as the confession was not transparently motivated by a desire to enlist the
attorney's aid in furthering the effects of the false testimony.
In sum, there appears to be no principled and practical way to condi-
tion the availability of the attorney-client privilege on the definitional
status of perjury or fraud as either "continuing" or "past" misconduct. The
more reasonable approach is to assume that perjury or testimonal fraud
enjoys the same status as other criminal conduct that is not actively ongo-
ing and, therefore, that the privilege can attach to communications be-
tween client and attorney that relate to testimony that already has been
given.
This assumption appears to have been made by the groups of ABA
lawyers who determined the shape of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility. It is the history of the ABA's version of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) which offers perhaps the most dramatic evidence in support of
the view that the attorney-client privilege would apply to lawyers con-
templating disclosing fraud or perjury committed by their clients. The ver-
sion of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) that was adopted by the ABA in 1969
was identical to the version of the Disciplinary Rule that currently is in
force in Missouri. 80 After the ABA adopted the 1969 form of the rule,
however, many attorneys concluded that complying with it would force
them to violate their obligation under the common law rules of privilege
not to disclose their clients' confidences. 81 This concern led the District of
Columbia Bar 82 and then the ABA itself to amend the original version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). 83 The amendment the ABA adopted in
1974, but which the Missouri Supreme Court has not embraced, qualified
the Disciplinary Rule's directive so that an attorney would not be bound to
"reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal... when the information
is protected as a privileged communication. ,84 As the ABA's Committee
80. See ABA Special Committee on Evaluation of Ethical Standards, CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102(B)(1) (Final Draft July 1, 1969).
81. See Callan & David, supra note 1, at 359-60; Freedman, Letter to the
Editor, 59 A.B.A.J. 114 (1973); Note, Attorneys' Liability-Advising, Abet
ting, and the SEC's "National Student Marketing" Offensive, 50 TEx. L. REV.
1265 (1972).
82. Freedman, supra note 81.
83. ABA OPINION No. 341.
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on Ethics and Professional Responsibility subsequently explained in
Formal Opinion 341, the primary reason for adopting the amendment was
the belief that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) as originally adopted re-
quired "a lawyer in certain instances to reveal privileged communications
which he also was duty-bound not to reveal according to the law of
evidence. The amendment of February 1974 was necessary in order to
relieve lawyers of exposure to such diametrically opposed professional
duties." 85 Adding that it was "unthinkable... that a lawyer should be sub-
ject to disciplinary action for failing to reveal information which by law is
not to be revealed without the consent of the client," the Committee
declared that the effect of the 1974 amendment was to extricate the at-
torney from "that untenable position. '86 The Missouri version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) appears to leave attorneys practicing in this
state in "that untenable position."
Before exploring alternative ways to respond to testimonal fraud that
would do less damage to the attorney-client privilege than the response
described in the Rule 4 version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), it is im-
portant to recognize that there are other basic values to which the com-
pulsory disclosure required by this Rule could do violence. Those values are
embodied in the right of criminal defendants to the effective assistance of
counsel, and in the rights of all persons not to be compelled by the govern-
ment to incriminate themselves.
IV. THE DILEMMA'S CONSTITUTIONAL HORNS
A. The Sixth Amendment Right to Effective
Assistance of Counsel
The sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel is in some
measure jeopardized by any rule of law that discourages a defendant from
sharing openly and fully with his lawyer all information that may be rele-
vant to his defense. 87 It is likely that the flow of information from criminal
defendants to their counsel will be constricted if defendants know that a
rule of professional responsibility will compel their attorney to disclose
their confidences whenever the attorney concludes that the accused has
lied or prepetrated a fraud. Conscientious criminal defense attorneys may
feel constrained to warn their clients at the outset of their relationship that
the attorney will be obligated to disclose any conduct by the client that oc-
curs during the representation that the attorney believes constitutes fraud.
Such warnings probably will make those accused more cautious and
85. ABA OPINION No. 341, at 2.
86. Id. at 3.
87. The author wishes to express his appreciation to Professor William A.
Knpx of the University of Missouri-Columbia School of Law for his considerable
assistance in understanding the relationship between the attorney-client privilege
and the sixth amendment right to effective assistance of counsel. See also
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 840-42.
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calculating about their communications to their attorneys. It seems
reasonable to predict that such caution and calculation will decrease the
amount of relevant information that reaches the lawyer. If so, defense
counsel's capacity to assist his client will be diminished correspondingly.
Thus it appears that the vitality of the sixth amendment right to the effec-
tive assistance of counsel is dependent upon the breadth and im-
penetrability of the attorney-client privilege to a significant degree.
B. The Fifth Amendment Privilege Against Compelled
Self-Incrimination
Less directly, but no less importantly, a rule that compels an attorney
to disclose what he believes to be fraud or prejury by a client also threatens
at least the spirit of the fifth amendment right against self-incrimination. 88
It appears that "at least the spirit" of the right against self-incrimination is
threatened because the full reach of the fifth amendment privilege re-
mains unclear.8 9 Recent opinions by the United States Supreme Court
which purport to elucidate the purposes and to restrict the applicability of
this privilege are confused at crucial junctures and therefore do not pro-
vide clear answers to the questions most pertinent here: (1) may (or
must) an attorney raise a fifth amendment objection on behalf of his client
and (2) could an assertion of that privilege by either an attorney or his
client justify an attorney's refusal to "reveal" a client's testimonial fraud or
perjury?
It is apparent that there is no clear answer to the first of these two ques-
tions: whether the courts will permit an attorney on his own initiative to
raise his client's fifth amendment right not to "be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself." 0 In its most recent pro-
nouncement on the subject the Supreme Court expressly refused to
"resolve this question."9 1 While there is some division among state and
88. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2251 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961); Rit-
chic, Compulsion that Violates the Fifth Amendment: The Burger Court's
Definition, 61 MINN. L. REV. 383, 383-84 (1977). See also Hazard, An Historical
Perspective of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061, 1062
(1978), where Professor Hazard writes:
Total abolition [of the privilege] would mean that an accused in a
criminal case could not explain his version of the matter to his lawyer
without its being transmitted to the prosecution. Defense counsel would
become a medium of confession, a result that would substantially impair
both the accused's right to counsel and the privilege against self-
incrimination. Hence, it is common ground that the privilege ought to
apply at least to communication by an accused criminal to his counsel, in
contemplation of defense of a pending or threatened prosecution, con-
cerning a completed crime.
89. See, e.g, Hazard, supra note 88. Much of Professor Hazard's article is
devoted to the theme that the history of the privilege contains no clear guidance
to the full reach of the doctrine.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 n.8 (1976).
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lower federal courts on the question, the majority view appears to be that
counsel may raise the fifth amendment objection on behalf of his client, at
least where it does not appear that the client wishes to forego the privilege
or has knowingly waived it.92 This issue was squarely presented in United
States v. Judson,93 where Judge Jertberg concluded his careful and per-
suasive analysis with the following paragraph:
We feel that the privilege-holder's mental attitude was sufficiently
demonstrated by the circumstances to be consistent with a desire
for the protection of the privilege and inconsistent with an in-
ference of waiver. This is enough, when coupled with a timely and
effective assertion by the attorney, to invoke the privilege. The
privilege must then be respected if the client himself could have
successfully raised it.
94
1. On Whom Must the Compulsion Be Exerted?
The more important and more difficult question is whether an asser-
tion of the client's fifth amendment privilege could justify an attorney's
refusal to disclose his client's fraud or perjury. Three relatively recent opin-
ions by the Supreme Court appear to offer some guidance in this area and
to suggest a negative answer to this question: Fisher v. United States,95
Andresen v. Maryland,96 and Couch v. United States.97 The reliability of
the guidance these decisions can offer is compromised, however, both by
the fact that they address distinguishable situations (the production or
seizure of incriminating documents) and, more importantly, by the poor
quality of the analysis and research they reflect.
Fisher v. United States is the most important of these opinions for pre-
sent purposes because the factual situation the Supreme Court confronted
was more closely analogous to the situation of an attorney who knows his
client has committed perjury than were the factual circumstances before
the Court in Andresen or Couch.98 In Fisher, taxpayers who knew they
were objects of federal tax investigations had removed from their account-
ants and delivered to their attorneys certain workpapers and reports the
accountants had generated while preparing the taxpayers' income tax
92. 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2270, at 416 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
93. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
94.' Id. at 467. See also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962),
cert. dknied, 371 U.S. 951 (1963); People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d 297(1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1019 (1967).
95. 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
96. 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
97. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
98. In Couch the holder of the fifth amendment privilege attempted
without success to use the privilege to prevent her accountant from producing the
business records she had left in the accountant's possession. In Andresen the
Court rejected an argument that seizure of a person's business records by law en-
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returns. The taxpayers had retained the attorneys to give them legal advice
with respect to the pending investigations. After learning who possessed
the documents "the Internal Revenue Service served summonses on the at-
torneys directing them to produce"99 specified workpapers and reports.
Relying in part on their client's fifth amendment rights against self-
incrimination, the attorneys refused to comply with the summonses.
The Court, speaking through Justice White, decided that compelling
the attorneys to produce the accountants' workpapers could not violate the
clients' fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination, regardless of
the status of their attorneys as their agents, and even if "the Amendment
would have barred a subpoena directing the taxpayer to produce the
documents while they were in his hands."' 00 Justice White reached these
conclusions by interpreting the scope of the fifth amendment privilege in
the narrow, literalistic manner that has characterized the Burger Court's
approach to self-incrimination issues.' 0 ' Drawing heavily on its opinion in
Couch, the Court insisted that the fifth amendment's protection against
self-incrimination is an exclusively "personal privilege" 102 in the sense that
it adheres solely to the person of the accused and not to incriminating in-
formation per se. 03 In the Court's view, it followed that there could be no
violation of the privilege unless the governmental compulsion was exerted
directly on the person of the accused. Regardless of other considerations
(such as the legitimacy of the accused's expectation of privacy when he
shared information with his attorney) the Court contended that the
privilege against self-incrimination cannot come into play at all when "the
ingredient of personal compulsion against an accused is lacking. '104
Justice White made the same point in different language in another part of
the opinion when he wrote: "The Court has held repeatedly that the
Fifth Amendment is limited to prohibiting the use of 'physical or moral
compulsion' exerted on the person asserting the privilege .... 10 The
Court reasoned that since the summonses to the attorneys exerted no com-
pulsion directly on the persons of the taxpapers, their fifth amendment
rights could not have been infringed, regardless of the authorship and the
incriminatory character of the materials thus discovered.
A mechanical application of this portion of the Fisher reasoning could
lead to the conclusion that the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination is not involved at all in the situation contemplated in
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). The compulsion of the Disciplinary Rule,
like the compulsion of the summonses in Fisher, is formally directed not
99. 425 U.S. at 394.
100. Id. at 397.
101. Ritchie, supra note 88, at 384-85, 430-31.
102. 425 U.S. at 398.
103. Id. at 398-99.
104. Id. at 397, quoting Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322, 329 (1973).
105. Id. (citations omitted).
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toward the client-accused, but toward the attorney. Because the ingre-
dient of personal compulsion exerted directly against the accused would be
lacking, the logic of this first section of the Fisher opinion would suggest
that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1)'s directive to the attorney could not
violate his client's fifth amendment privilege.10 6
2. When Is Disclosure "Voluntary"?
The Court in Fisher did not conclude its analysis at this point,
however. Instead, it went on to posit a relationship between the privilege
against self-incrimination and the attorney-client privilege that leaves the
fifth amendment privilege in a position to play a vital role in situations
where the government pressures attorneys to make disclosures that could
incriminate their clients. Before evaluating this second portion of the
Fisher opinion, however, it is necessary to examine aspects of the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Andresen and Couch which, if accepted at face
value, would appear to reinforce the Fisher conclusion that compelling
an attorney to disclose incriminating client confidences could not violate
the client's fifth amendment privilege.
In Andresen, the accused challenged the government's use of a search
warrant to seize self-incriminating business records directly from his
office. 107 Treading a thin logical tightrope, the Court concluded that this
forced seizure did not violate the accused's fifth amendment privilege both
because he was not compelled to participate at all in the physical process
by which the government acquired the documents (government agents ex-
ecuted the warrant and made the seizure as the accused looked on) and
because he had been under no governmental compulsion when he record-
ed the incriminating information that appeared in the seized papers.
It takes no great leap of legal imagination to anticipate courts that
share the Andresen majority's predisposition using its approach to con-
clude that compelling a criminal defense attorney to disclose his client's
fraud or perjury does no violence to the client's fifth amendment privilege.
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), like the seizure in Andresen, does not com-
pel the client to participate physically in the process by which disclosure is
made. It also is true that, at least formally, the Disciplinary Rule exerts no
compulsion directly on the accused to make any statements at all; instead,
the argument would run that the rule merely permits the state to "seize,"
106. Superficially reasoned support for Justice White's conclusion can be
found in Bouschor v. United States, 316 F.2d 451, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1963) and
United States v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 886 (D.N.J.), appeal dismissed, 274 F.2d
860 (3d Cir. 1959). Professor Ritchie suggests that the Burger majority may be
moving toward limiting the protection the fifth amendment privilege affords to
blocking the use at trial of self-incriminating declarations (and, perhaps, their
fruits) that were acquired by governmental compulsion. See Ritchie, supra note
88, at 386-92, 430.
107. 427 U.S. at 471-72.
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through defense counsel's disclosure, the statements the accused made
"6voluntarily" to his attorney.
The superficiality of this kind of mechanical application of the An-
dresen approach invites an immediate rejoinder. 10 8 Why courts should
ascribe such importance to whether or not the accused participates
physically in the disclosure process is not at all clear. The history of the
privilege against self-incrimination reflects a major concern with curtail-
ing the state's power to invade the psychic space and the mental processes
of the accused. 0 9 As Justice Powell wrote for the Court in Couch: "By its
very nature, the privilege is an intimate and personal one. It respects a
private inner sanctum of individual feeling and thought and proscribes
state intrusion to extract self-condemnation.""10 In addition, Justice
Powell cited with approval the Court's description of the "policies and pur-
poses of the privilege""' in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,"12 a
description that included "our respect for the inviolability of the human
personality and of the right of each individual 'to a private enclave where
he may lead a private life.' "113 Because such concerns inform the history
and spirit of the fifth amendment privilege, it makes no sense when
deciding whether the privilege is violated to focus exclusively on whether or
not the governmental compulsion requires physical participation by the
accused in the process of disclosure.
In a separate concurrence in Couch, Justice Brennan offered support
for this view in the following words:
[T]here is no doubt that the Fifth Amendment is concerned soley
with compulsory self-incrimination. But surely the availability of
the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot depend on whether or not
the owner of the documents is compelled personally to turn the
documents over to the Government. If private, testimonial
documents held in the owner's own possession are privileged under
the Fifth Amendment, then the Government cannot nullify that
privilege by finding a way to obtain the documents without requir-
ing the owner to take them in hand and personally present them to
the Government agents. Where the Government takes private
records from, for example, a safety deposit box against the will of
the owner of the documents, the owner has been compelled, in my
108. For a more thorough re-examination of the role the fifth amendment
privilege should play in the situation contemplated in DR 7-102(B)(1), see text ac-
companying notes 88-156 infra.
109. See, e.g., 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2250-51 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961).
110. 409 U.S. at 327.
111. Id. at 328.
112. 378 U.S. 52, 55 (1964).
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view, to incriminate himself within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment. 114
As the Court has many times indicated, the policies reflected in the
fifth amendment privilege are endangered whenever the thoughts or the
"inner sanctum" of the accused are invaded by governmental pressure to
make self-incriminatory disclosures. 't 5 Nor must the prohibited "compul-
sion" be exerted on the accused physically. For at least fifty years, the
Court had recognized that the fifth amendment reaches governmental
misuse of either "physical or moral compulsion.
1 1 6
It hardly seems reasonable to view disclosure to counsel by a client who
fears he has committed perjury as wholly "voluntary." A client who fears
he has committed perjury is likely to feel great pressure to disclose his con-
cern to his lawyer. That pressure, all of which is directly or indirectly at-
tributable to the state, derives from : (1) the fact that conviction for per-
jury can result in severe penal sanctions; (2) the fact that discovery of per-
jury can badly damage a defendant's case; and (3) the need the client
experiences for professional help in determining what constitutes an of-
fense and how to proceed if an offense has been committed.
When these kinds of pressures result in a client confiding in counsel
about his testmony, the Code of Professional Responsibility compels the
attorney not only to involve his client in the process that can lead to an in-
criminating disclosure, but also to exert additional pressure on the client
to reveal his own perjury. 1 1 7 By requiring the attorney to "promptly call
upon his client to rectify" his fraud, Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) forces
the attorney (who would be acting at this juncture as an officer of the court
and, therefore, of the state) to invade the client's "private enclave" and to
exert moral pressure on him to become a witness against himself. Such
pressure by the government would appear to implicate the fifth amend-
ment privilege unless the client were thoroughly protected by an immunity
that prohibited the government from using his self-incriminating
disclosures (or the fruits thereof) in any subsequent criminal or quasi-
criminal proceeding.1 8
In Missouri, Mo. Rev. Stat. section 575.040.4 appears to offer an ac-
cused immunity from prosecution for the offense of perjury if he
"retracted the false statement in the course of the official proceeding in
114. 409 U.S. at 337* (Brennan, J., concurring). See also Justice Brennan's
dissent in Andresen, 427 U.S. at 484.
115. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416-17 (1976); United
States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 233-34 (1975); Couch v. United States, 409 U.S.
322, 327-28 (1973); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52, 54-77 (1964);
Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 426-28 (1955).
116. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 397 (1976).
117. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B)(1), EC 7-7 & 7-8.
118. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). See also Ritchie, supra
note 88, at 387-93; Strachan, Self-Incrimination, Immunity, and Watergate, 56
TEX. L. REv. 791 (1978).
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which it was made ... [but only if] he did so before the falsity of the state-
ment was exposed."'1 9 Even if this statute is construed as offering a com-
plete defense to a prosecution for perjury that has been properly rectified,
it offers no defense or immunity when the proceedings in which the fraud
occurred have been terminated or when the fraud is disclosed before the
client can rectify it. Moreover, it does not bar use of either the client's ad-
mission or its evidentiary fruits in subsequent prosecutions on charges
other than perjury.
3. When Is An Expectation of Privacy Legitimate?
While the Court in Andresen focused much of its analytical attention
on the requirement of the fifth amendment privilege that disclosure not be
"voluntary," the Court in Couch explored another requirement of the
privilege: the expectation of privacy. Justice Powell, writing for the
Couch majority, declared without equivocation that "no Fourth and Fifth
Amendment claim can prevail where... there exists no legitimate expec-
tation of privacy."120 While it might seem indisputable that a client who
confides in his attorney about the character of testimony he has given has a
legitimate expectation of privacy, the way Justice Powell analyzed the
privacy question in Couch casts a shadow of doubt over this issue. The rela-
tionship in question in Couch was not between attorney and client, but be-
tween client and accountant. The Court noted that "no confidential
accountant-client privilege exists under federal law, and no state-created
privilege has been recognized in federal cases."'' 21 Conceding that the
absence of such a privilege was "not in itself controlling," 122 Justice Powell
proceeded to determine whether a taxpayer who turned over her business
and tax records to an accountant could legitimately expect their contents
to remain confidential. In concluding that any expectation of privacy or
confidentiality would be illegitimate in this situation, Justice Powell relied
on two related factors: (1) the formal obligation the income tax laws im-
pose on the accountant (and taxpayer) to disclose most of the contents of
the business records and (2) the fact that since the accountant would risk
criminal prosecution if he wilfully withheld information, "[h]is own
need for self-protection would often require the right to disclose the infor-
mation given him.' 23 It was largely because the client-taxpayer was seek-
ing fifth amendment protection "in the very situation where [such] obliga-
tions of disclosure exist" that the Court in Couch concluded that she could
have no legitimate expectation of privacy in the documents.12 4
A mechanical application of Justice Powell's approach to the privacy
question could lead courts to the conclusion that in jurisdictions which em-
119. RSMo § 575.040.4 (1978).
120. 409 U.S. at 336.
121. Id. at 335.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 335-36.
630 [Vol. 44
30
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 44, Iss. 4 [1979], Art. 1
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol44/iss4/1
CLIENT PERJURY
brace the Missouri version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), no client
could have a legitimate expectation of privacy when he reveals informa-
tion to his attorney that leaves his attorney convinced that he has
perpetrated a fraud. The use of Justice Powell's logic would proceed as
follows: Since the Missouri version of the Disciplinary Rule requires
counsel to reveal frauds which clients leave unrectified, and since breach
of that obligation exposes counsel to the risk of severe sanctions and, ther-
by, creates in counsel a "need for self-protection [that] would often require
the right to disclose the information given him,"' 25 no client legitimately
could expect his attorney to keep private the confidential communications
which clearly establish the proscribed conduct.
The simple symmetry of this argument masks some serious flaws in it.
Unlike the relationship between client and accountant, the relationship
between client and attorney is permeated with expectations of confiden-
tiality which individual attorneys cultivate in order to secure the informa-
tion and cooperation from their clients which is necessary for effective
legal representation. Recognizing the indispensability of client confidence
in counsel, our system aggressively encourages its users to expect the infor-
mation they share with their lawyers to remain private. It seems
unreasonable to foster and reinforce that expectation with respect to all
categories of past conduct except one: fraud that occurs while a person is
being represented.
The unreasonableness of trying to insulate information about that one
category of past conduct from the expectation of privacy becomes more
apparent in light of the uncertainty clients frequently will feel concerning
the implications of information they would like to share with counsel.
Because the term "fraud" is so ill-defined (even by courts and legal
scholars), 126 there will be many instances in which individual clients will
not be able to predict whether certain information will lead their attorneys
to conclude that they have committed fraud or prejury. If they cannot
foresee what the information will mean to their lawyer, how can clients
form an expectation about the status of its confidentiality? Moreover, it is
wholly unrealistic to assume that the information and feelings clients have
are neatly separable into two completely distinct categories: one that in-
cludes the data that is relevant only to whether fraud has been committed
and another that includes only the data that is needed to represent the
client in the matter for which counsel was hired. Since it will happen fre-
quently that some information clients possess both will have implications
about their veracity, and will be necessary for effective representation,
clients frequently will be encouraged to form mutually exclusive expecta-
tions about the same information. Clients will be encouraged to expect the
information to remain confidential when used in the matter for which
counsel was retained, but simultaneously will be encouraged to expect it to
125. Id. at 335.
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be disclosed for the purpose of initiating proceedings against them for
fraud or prejury.
It is impossible for clients to separate their information into two whol-
ly independent categories and to attach one clear expectation (of con-
fidentiality) to the data in one category while attaching an opposite but
equally clear expectation (of disclosure) to the information in the other
category. In addition, a large percentage of all the relevant communica-
tions from clients to lawyers is not subject to disclosure. In light of these
two factors, it would appear reasonable for a client to develop one expecta-
tion about the confidentiality of all of the information she shares with her
attorney. Regardless of the version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) that
happens to be in effect at a particular time in a given jurisdiction, the
client's expectation would be that her communications to her lawyer will
remain confidential.
The reasonableness (and therefore the legitimacy) of that expectation
of confidentiality seems even clearer when one compares certain
characteristics of the attorney-client privilege and the Missouri version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). The privilege reflects the general rule from
which Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) represents a narrow exception. The
privilege has occupied a central place in the Anglo-American legal tradi-
tion for generations and is recognized in all jurisdictions in the United
States. 127
The duty of disclosure that is embodied in Missouri's version of the
Disciplinary Rule, by contrast, has not always been recognized in the past.
For example, between 1953 and 1969 the ABA did not recognize the duty
of disclosure at all.1 28 Even today there are many jurisdictions which do not
recognize the duty.1 29 In short, while the availabilty to individual criminal
defendants of the attorney-client privilege has remained relatively con-
stant over time and between jurisdictions, the same cannot be said of the
Disciplinary Rule. Clients who consult lawyers from different jurisdictions
or in different years cannot predict with confidence when, if ever, their
counsel will be subject to a duty to disclose. Nor can a client assume that
when such duties exist in different jurisdictions they always extend to the
same information or arise in the same circumstances. 30 Because the ex-
istence and reach of the duty to disclose is so unpredictable, it is not
reasonable to assume that clients will shape their expectations of privacy
around it.
The United States Supreme Court again confronted the role expecta-
tions of privacy should play in analysis of fifth amendment privilege pro-
127. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2290 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961)
(discussing the history and development of the attorney-client privilege).
128. See ABA OPINION No. 341, at 85-86.
129. See note 6 supra.
130. See discussion of In re A., In re Malloy, and Committee on Professional
Ethics v. Crary in Wolfram, supra note 1, at 827-31. See also note 6 supra for
discussion of the current status of the Rule in each state.
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blems in Fisher. In an opinion to which seven justices subscribed, Justice
White concluded that the framers did not intend the fifth amendment to
"serve as a general protector of privacy.' 13 1 Instead, he declared, the fifth
amendment right can offer protection to interests in personal privacy only
when the government invades those interests by attempting to compel self-
incriminating testimonial information directly from individual holders of
the privilege. 132 According to the Fisher Court, individuals seeking to pro-
tect self-incriminating testimony that the government pursued through
means other than direct compulsion on an accused would have to look to
sources other than the fifth amendment for help.
4. Can Fifth Amendment Rights Justify Assertions of the
Attorney-Client Privilege?
Of the three possible sources of such help which Justice White iden-
tified in Fisher, 133 the only one that is arguably applicable to the facts of
that case and to the situation contemplated in Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) is the "evidentiary... attorney client privilege." 3 4 The irony
of the Fisher opinion, however, is that after purporting to discard the fifth
amendment privilege as a basis upon which counsel could refuse to disclose
the information sought by the government, the Court construed the
attorney-client privilege in a way that would permit the client's privilege
against self-incrimination to block governmental use of that same infor-
mation. The portion of the Fisher opinion where Justice White explores
the availability of the attorney-client privilege and its relationship with the
fifth amendment privilege is critically important to understanding how to
resolve the conflicts between the policies and interests that are involved
when an attorney in Missouri is convinced that his client has committed
fraud or prejury. Unfortunately, this portion of Justice White's opinion is
badly confused and based on misreadings of both a key section of Dean
Wigmore's treatise on evidence and relevant lower federal court
opinions. 135
In essence, the Fisher court boot-strapped the fifth amendment
privilege back into its analysis through the evidentiary attorney-client
privilege. This boot-strapping proceeded as follows. Since the fifth
amendment privilege cannot be violated when the government compul-
sion is directed not toward the accused but toward his attorney, the only
privilege that remains in issue when the government seeks information
from an attorney that could incriminate his client is the evidentiary
131. 425 U.S. at 401.
132. Id. at 400.
133. The other two were the first and fourth amendments, neither of which
seems applicable to the situation contemplated in DR 7-102(B)(1). Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 & n.7 (1976).
134. Id.
135. See notes 138-46 and accompanying text infra. 33
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attorney-client privilege. That privilege may play a role when the im-
mediate object of the government pressure is the attorney, even though the
holder of the privilege is the client, because "it is universally accepted that
the attorney-client privilege may be raised by the attorney.' 1 36 The pur-
pose of the attorney-client privilege is to encourage clients to make
disclosures to their attorneys that are "necessary to obtain informed legal
advice"137 and that might not be made if the privilege were not recognized.
If a client possessed information (in documentary form in Fisher) that
would be protected by the fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination if he retained possession of it, the purpose of the attorney-
client privilege would be defeated if the law made that same information
subject to disclosure merely by virtue of the fact that the client shared it
with counsel (assuming that the sharing was in confidence and for the pur-
pose of securing legal advice). To conclude his argument Justice White
borrowed a passage from what he assumed was the relevant portion of
Dean Wigmore's treatise: "It follows, then, that when the client himself
would be privileged from production of the document.., as exempt from
self-incrimination, the attorney having possession of the document is not
bound to produce. 1 38 In addition to this section of Dean Wigmore's
treatise and the cases it cited, Justice White offered as support for this
reasoning two opinions by United States Courts of Appeals: United
States v. Judson13 9 and Colton v. United States.140
A major difficulty with this crucial portion ofJustice White's opinion is
that the authorities on which he relied do not support the line of reasoning
he employed. In fact, these authorites squarely support the proposition re-
jected by Justice White earlier in the Fisher opinion, namely, that counsel
could assert his client's fifth amendment privilege as an independently suf-
ficient ground for refusing to disclose data acquired from his client as long
as the client could have asserted that privilege if the government had ex-
erted its compulsion directly on him.' 4'
136. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. at 402 n.8.
137. Id. at 403.
138. Id. at 404, quoting 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
139. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
140. 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
141. Wigmore explicitly states that "the courts.., frequently permit counsel
for the witness to call the witness' attention to the [fifth amendment] privilege or
to plead it in his behalf." 8J. WIGMORE. EVIDENCE § 2270, at 416 (McNaughton
rev. ed. 1961) (emphasis added).
JudgeJertberg, writing inJudson, also clearly indicated that the attorney could
assert the client's fifth amendment privilege and that "the privilege must then be
respected if the client himself could have successfully raised it." United States v.
Judson, 322 F.2d at 467. For further discussion of this case, see text following note
142 infra.
The Colton court likewise took this approach, stating that "if a proper showing
is made, [attorney] Colton will be able to raise the [client's] privilege against self-
incrimination." Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d at 639.
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While the authorities cited by Justice White considered factual situa-
tions comparable to the one before the Court in Fisher, they arrived at a
very different and much more defensible solution. The common problem
faced in these authorities, and in Fisher, was how to treat data that was not
protected by the attorney-client privilege because it was produced by
clients (or, in Fisher, by third persons) before the attorney-client relation-
ship had been formed and not for the purpose of communicating with
counsel. None of the authorities suggest, as Justice White's citation of
them implies, that such data, which otherwise clearly could not qualify for
the attorney-client privilege, somehow could be brought within the protec-
tive reach of that privilege merely because the data would be protected
from disclosure by the fifth amendment privilege if it were in the posses-
sion of the accused. This "solution," which the Fisher Court apparently
manufactured for the first time, does great violence to the criteria which in
all other circumstances must be satisfied before the attorney-client
privilege can be invoked successfully. The authorities cited by Justice
White avoided so distorting the theory of the attorney-client privilege by
not relying on it at all. Instead, they relied directly and exclusively on the
fifth amendment privilege. 142
The most lucid and carefully reasoned of the opinions cited by Justice
White in support of his boot-strap reasoning was written byJudgeJertberg
for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Judson.143 Judge Jertberg,
however, resorted to no boot-strapping. After concluding that the
attorney-client privilege could not protect the documents in question
142. See 8J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2307, at 591-92 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1962). See also Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1961); United States
v. Judson, 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
It is important to appreciate that Justice White was not focusing here on any
'communications' from client to attorney that might be implicit in the act of
delivering the documents to counsel. That act, for example, might be said to im-
plicitly communicate that the client had possessed the documents and/or that he
authenticated them. While it is arguable that such tacit communications could
be protected by the attorney-client privilege, that is not the argument Justice
White was making in this portion of his opinion. Instead he focused on the infor-
mation that would be communicated by the contents of the documents. Thus, in
Justice White's view it was the documents themselves that could have been pro-
tected by the attorney-client privilege if the fifth amendment privilege would
have been available if the client had retained the papers and been the direct
target of the government's compulsion. In a subsequent section of his opinion
Justice White discussed the possibility that producing documents in response to a
subpoena might have "communicative" implications-but that discussion focus-
ed exclusively on the fifth amendment privilege. 425 U.S. at 410-14. Justice
White never acknowledged that the act of delivering documents to counsel might
involve implicit "communications" or that such communications might qualify
for protection by the attorney-client privilege. Nor did he discuss the argument
that in order to protect communications that might be implicit in the art of
delivering documents to counsel it might be necessary to protect from disclosure
the documents themselves.
143. 322 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1963).
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(which predated the attorney-client relationship) and that the fifth
amendment privilege would have prevented the government from com-
pelling the taxpayers themselves to produce the documents if the taxpayers
had retained possession of them, JudgeJertberg proceeded to consider the
primary issue: whether the attorney could use his clients' fifth amend-
ment privilege to justify refusing to deliver the documents to the govern-
ment. After carefully evaluating conflicting precedents, JudgeJertberg of-
fered the following rationale for his conclusion:
Clearly, if the taxpayer.., had been subpoenaed and directed to
produce the documents in question, he could have properly refus-
ed. The government concedes this. But instead of closeting himself
with his myriad tax data drawn up around him, the taxpayer re-
tained counsel. Quite predictably, in the course of the ensuing
attorney-client relationship the pertinent records were turned over
to the attorney. The government would have us hold that the tax-
payer walked into his attorney's office unquestionably shielded
with the Amendment's protection, and walked out with something
less. 144
The thrust of the Fifth Amendment is that "prosecutors are
forced to search for independent evidence instead of relying upon
proof extracted from individuals by force of law.
' 145
The government states that the evil which the Fifth Amend-
ment sought to prevent is not present when the prosecution seeks
evidence of A's guilt from B. But this argument ignores the
realities of the relationship existing where B is A's attorney. An at-
torney is his client's advocate. His function is to raise all the just
and meritorious defenses his client has. No other "third party,"
nor "agent," nor "representative" stands in such a unique relation-
ship between the accused and the judicial process as does his at-
torney. He is the only person besides the client himself who is per-
mitted to prepare and conduct the defense of the matter under in-
vestigation. The attorney and his client are so identical with
respect to the function of the evidence and to the proceedings
which call for its production that any distinction is mere
sophistry. 146
How Justice White could cite this opinion by Judge Jertberg as authority
for the proposition that counsel seeking to protect his client's in-
criminating documents from disclosure could not invoke the fifth amend-
ment privilege, but instead would have to rely on the attorney-client
privilege, remains a mystery.
144. Id. at 466.
145. Id. (quoting United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 698 (1943) (citation
omitted)).
146. Id. at 467.
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A major question the Fisher Court leaves unasked and unanswered is
why the fact that material could qualify in different circumstances for pro-
tection by a different privilege should enable it to qualify automatically for
protection by the attorney-client privilege, even though that material
undeniably fails to satisfy the otherwise universally applied requirements
of the latter privilege. The Fisher Court's failure to come to terms with this
telling conceptual difficulty bodes ill for the longevity of its analytical ap-
proach. That fact suggests the advisability of not relying exclusively on
Justice White's reasoning in attempting to determine what role the fifth
amendment privilege should play in the situation contemplated in
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). Because it represents the Supreme Court's
most treatment of related questions, however, Justice White's approach
cannot be ignored. It seems wise, therefore, to evaluate the role of the fifth
amendment privilege in situations where counsel believes his client has
committed fraud or perjury on the basis of two different analytical
models: the one provided by the Fisher Court and the other provided by
the authorities which the Fisher Court misread.
Even under the Fisher Court's theory, the fifth amendment privilege
should have a substantial impact on an attorney's thinking about how to
proceed after concluding that his client has perjured himself. It seems in-
disputable that a client could invoke the fifth amendment privilege tojustify refusing to reveal his own fraud or perjury if Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) attempted to impose an obligation to do so directly on him. 47
Justice White's reasoning in Fisher suggests that in this situation a rule of
law that required an attorney to disclose information his client could have
protected if he had not communicated it in confidence to counsel would
jeopardize the primary purpose of the attorney-client privilege. It would
follow in Justice White's view that when the client clearly could have used
his fifth amendment privilege as grounds for refusing to reveal his fraud or
perjury, his attorney may rely on the attorney-client privilege in refusing to
disclose that alleged misconduct.1 4 Moreover, where an attorney is em-
powered to invoke the attorney-client privilege on behalf of clients he must
do so unless otherwise directed by the holders of the privilege. 14 9 Under the
Fisher Court's reasoning, then, an attorney whose client had not consented
to disclosure of his misconduct could not comply with the directive of
Missouri's version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) without violating the
147. UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE rule 25 (1953); MODEL CODE OF
EVIDENCE RULE 203 and Comment thereto (1942).
148. See Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402-05 (1976). The fact that
in Fisher the potentially self-incriminating information was reduced to writing
before the attorney-client relationship commenced, whereas the communications
from client to attorney which "reveal" the client's fraud or perjury could be oral
or written and will occur after the formation of the professional relationship,
would not appear to affect the structure of the Fisher analysis.
149. See, e.g., CALIF. EVID. CODE§ 955 (West 1966);J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE§ 2307 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
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obligation the law of evidence imposes upon him to preserve the confiden-
tiality of communications that are protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
For counsel who is convinced his client has committed fraud or per-
jury, JudgeJertberg's approach would create a much more direct confron-
tation between the client's fifth amendment privilege and the directives of
Missouri's 7-102(B)(1). Absent a free and knowing waiver by his client, an
attorney who revealed a client's fraud or perjury to a court would be
violating that client's fifth amendment right not to incriminate himself.
Moreover, attorneys making such revelations would be violating
simultaneously a client's rights under the attorney-client privilege if they
learned about the fraud or perjury through confidential communications.
Although a literal reading of Fisher and Andresen might seem to in-
dicate that none of the values or policies that support the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination would be implicated if an attorney
complied with the Missouri version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) and
revealed his client's fraud or perjury to a judge or prosecutor, this view
would seem difficult to sustain. In Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,150
a 1964 Supreme Court opinion cited with approval in Couch,'5'
Andresen,152 and Fisher,5 3 the Court declared that:
The privilege against self-incrimination ... reflects many of our
fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our unwill-
ingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel trilemma of
self-accusation, perjury or contempt . . .our sense of fair play
which dictates "a fair state-individual balance by requiring the
government to leave the individual alone until good cause is shown
for disturbing him and by requiring the government in its contest
with the individual to shoulder the entire load".., our respect for
the inviolability of the human personality and of the right of each
individual "to a private enclave where he may lead a private life"
, * .and our realization that the privilege, while sometimes "a
shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection to the innocent.' 5 4
The obligations Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) imposes on Missouri at-
torneys, and the pressures it imposes through them on clients, threaten
some of these "fundamental values." Our system of justice is so complex
that a client must turn openly and without fear to his attorney or be left
vulnerable and alienated. It is this fact that makes attorney and client,
especially in defense of a criminal charge, so psychologically and func-
tionally interdependent that in a very real sense they become "one person"
before the law. Since it is our adversarial legal system that compels this
150. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
151. 409 U.S. at 328.
152. 427 U.S. at 476.
153. 425 U.S. at 399.
154. 378 U.S. at 55.
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identification, it is indeed, in Judge Jertberg's phrase, "mere sophistry"
to argue that the client is not being compelled to incriminate himself when
the state forces the professional representative without whom he could not
survive in the legal system to reveal his confidences.
Despite these considerations, the Missouri version of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) would convert counsel into a conduit for self-incrimination.
To so convert the client's professional ally seems especially inconsistent
with "our sense of fair play" because it forces clients to choose between two
unacceptable alternatives: (1) attempt to do something for which they
are wholly unequipped (i. e., to second guess their lawyer and the law and
then to manipulate carefully the flow of information to counsel) or,
(2) open up fully to their representative and take the risk that he will con-
clude that they have committed fraud or perjury and pressure them to
make self-incriminating admissions, or if he is not satisfied, turn on them
by disclosing his view of the facts to "the affected person or tribunal."1 55
In effect, Missouri's version of the Disciplinary Rule would turn
private lawyers into agents of the state for three purposes. It would compel
counsel (1) to monitor and to pass judgment on the conduct of his client,
(2) to pressure his client to reveal any conduct which, in counsel's judg-
ment, constituted fraud and (3) to inform the affected tribunal or person
whenever his client refused to respond to that pressure. To convert private
counsel into agents of the prosecution for these purposes seems patently in-
consistent with "requiring the government in its contest with the individual
to shoulder the entire load.1 56
V. PROPOSALS FOR MISSOURI COURTS AND COUNSEL
It seems reasonable to assume that before deciding Fisher and An-
dresen, the United States Supreme Court considered, and rejected,
arguments of the kind made above. If the Burger majority remains both
unmoved by such considerations and committed to its narrow, literalistic
interpretation of the fifth amendment privilege, it is highly unlikely that
the Court would rule that compliance by counsel with Missouri's version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) would violate a client's right under the Con-
stitution of the United States not to "be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself.1 . 7 If the Court followed its reasoning in
Fisher, however, it probably would hold that compelling an attorney to
reveal fraud or perjury which, because of the fifth amendment the client
could not be directly compelled to disclose, would violate the client's rights
under the law of attorney-client privilege.
Even if such predictions about how the United States Supreme Court
would rule on these issues were reliable, however, they would not
155. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(B)(1).
156. Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. at 55.
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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necessarily determine the legal status in Missouri of its version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). While the Supreme Court has analyzed
these questions on the basis of its own view of the common law' 5 and the
Constitution of the United States, Missouri courts also must consider
Missouri authority. The Missouri Constitution' 9 and Mo. Rev. Stat. sec-
tion 491.040160 are independent sources of a privilege against self-
incrimination which Missouri courts are free to construe to provide protec-
tions which the United States Supreme Court declines to find in the fifth
amendment. Similarly, the right to the effective assistance of counsel has
independent sources in state law16 1 that Missouri courts might find incom-
patible with the directives of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). Moreover, as
Missouri's highest court reaffirmed recently in State ex rel. Great
American Insurance Co. v. Smith, the attorney-client privilege is a pro-
duct of the common law, 162 a law whose boundaries in any one state can be
defined and modified by the courts of that state. 163 It follows that Missouri
158. Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 402 n.8 (1976).
159. MO. CONST. art. I, § 19.
160. RSMo § 491.040 (1978).
161. The Missouri Constitution provides that "in criminal prosecutions the
accused shall have the right to appear and defend, in person and by counsel."
MO. CONST., art. I, § 18(a). In addition, RSMO § 545.820 (1978) states:
If any person about to be arraigned upon an indictment for a felony be
without counsel to conduct his defense, and be unable to employ any, it
shall be the duty of the court to assign him counsel, at his request, not ex-
ceeding two....
The Missouri Supreme Court has expanded even further upon the right to ef-
fective counsel in its rules, stating:
In every criminal prosecution in any court in this State, the accused
shall have the right to appear and defend the same in person and by
counsel. If any person charged with the commission of a felony appears
upon arraignment without counsel, it shall be the duty of the court to ad-
vise him of his right to counsel, and of the willingness of the court to ap-
point counsel to represent him if he is unable to employ counsel. If the
defendant so requests, and if it appears from a showing of indigency that
he is unable to employ counsel, it shall be the duty of the court to appoint
counsel to represent him. If, after being informed as to his rights, the
defendant indicates his desire to proceed without the benefit of counsel,
and the court finds that he has intelligently waived his right to counsel,
the court shall have no duty to appoint counsel unless it appears to the
court that ... the failure to appoint counsel may result in injustice to the
defendant. Counsel so appointed shall be allowed a reasonable time in
which to prepare the defense.
MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.01(a). See also State v. Johnstone, 335 S.W.2d 199 (Mo.
1960), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 842, rehearing denied, 364 U.S. 906 (1960); Ex
parte Stone, 255 S.W.2d 155 (Spr. Mo. App. 1953).
162. State ex rel. Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Smith, 574 S.W.2d at 382.
163. See, e.g., Morgenthaler v. First At. Nat'l Bank, 80 So.2d 446, 452-53
(Fla. 1955) (courts are not bound to adhere to a common law concept which is
contrary to a just result); Woods v. Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 354, 102 N.E.2d 691,
694 (1951) (it is duty of the court to re-examine the common law and adapt it to
current conditions as justice demands); State v. Esser, 16 Wis. 2d 567, 572, 115
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courts are not bound, for example, by the interpretation in Fisher of the
attorney-client privilege. 16 4
Because the values and policies implicated by the Rule 4 version of
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) are so fundamental, Missouri courts should
conduct an independent, open evaluation of this disciplinary rule. While
they should attend carefully to relevant opinions by the United States
Supreme Court, they should not feel bound by its reasoning or the conclu-
sions it has reached.
A. Arguments for Amending or Abandoning DR 7-102(B)
In any thorough examination of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1), the
values which the current form of the rule in Missouri is designed to pro-
mote should be accorded substantial weight. Those values relate to preserv-
ing the integrity of the judicial process, improving the reliability of the in-
formation upon which settlements are based and judgments are rendered,
and discouraging testimonial misrepresentations. 65 The importance in
the abstract of these societal interests is obvious. It is far less obvious,
however, that -the disciplinary rule in its current form in Missouri
significantly helps to secure these ends. Before reaching any conclusions
about the wisdom or constitutionality of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1),
Missouri courts should examine the possibility that its net overall effect on
the administration of justice is negative. It is conceivable, for example,
that the obligation to reveal misconduct that the rule imposes on attorneys
makes clients more afraid and distrustful of their lawyers than they other-
wise would be, and encourges clients to conceal information from or lie to
their counsel from the outset of the professional relationship. 166 The duty
to disclose also may encourage lawyers to warn their clients not to
N.W.2d 505, 512-13 (1962) (courts may adapt and develop the common law as
part of the judicial power).
164. See Krug v. Reissig, 488 P.2d 150, 152 (Wyo. 1971) (judicial decisions of
other jurisdictions are merely interpretations of the common law, and the courts
of a state are at liberty to adopt the interpretation they think best).
165. In fact, it has been persuasively argued that the deterioration of these
values would undermine the very basis of the adversary system by reducing the
social acceptability of judicial decisions. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 833 &
n.91. Cf. McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761 (5th Cir. 1967) (attorney's
disclosure to the court of his client's admission of perjury was essential to publicinterest); People v. Beattie, 137 Ill. 553, 574 (1891) (attorney owes duty of good
faith to the court so that it may do justice); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 262, 322
P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (1958) (attorney, as an officer of the court, has a primary
duty to disclose known perjury). See also H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 74-78
(1953).
166. See generally M. FREEDMAN, LAWYER'S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM ch. 3 (1975). Professor Freedman notes that "the inevitable result of the[hard-line] position [against use of perjured testimony] ... would be to caution
the client not to be completely candid with the attorney." Id. at 38.
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volunteer information and not to make incriminating admissions. 167
Similarly, that duty could discourage defense counsel from conducting the
kind of aggressive, wide-open investigations that are essential to quality
representation. If the disciplinary rule provokes such responses, its net ef-
fect may be to promote irrational settlements and plea bargains, to
decrease the reliability of evidentiary records, and to expand the scope of
testimonial misrepresentations. Moreover, it is not unlikely that the rule
generates far too few benefits to compensate for such costs. If Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B)(1) has moved a significant number of Missouri lawyers to
disclose fraud or perjury committed by their clients, that fact is a well-
guarded secret.1 6 8
Regardless of the outcome of this kind of an evaluation of how well the
rule in its present form serves the values it is said to reflect, it is likely that
complying with the disclosure commandment of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) would do severe damage both to the values and policies which
support the privilege against self-incrimination, and to the rights of clients
that are supposed to be secured by the attorney-client privilege and by the
sixth amendment to the United States Constitution. This likelihood,
coupled with a strong suspicion that the disciplinary rule contributes little
to the advancement of the interests it was intended to promote, supports a
recommendation that the Missouri Supreme Court at least amend
Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) by removing the duty to disclose it now im-
poses.
It is not at all clear that adopting the ABA's version of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(1) would remove all of the threats to the rights of clients that are
now created by Missouri's version of that Rule. In Formal Opinion 341, the
ABA's Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility interpreted
the 1974 amendment to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) as protecting
against disclosure not only communications which satisfy the requirements
of the attorney-client privilege, but also all "secrets," which Disciplinary
Rule 4-101(A) expansively defines as including "other information gained
in the professional relationship that the client has requested be held in-
violate or the disclosure of which would be embarrassing or would be likely
to be detrimental to the client. 1 69 This broad interpretation of the 1974
amendments offers the values that support the attorney-client privilege
considerable protection from Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). Even under
this broad interpretation, however, the ABA's version of the Rule could
167. Id. See also A. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY chs. 3 & 4 (1976).
168. It appears that no attorneys in Missouri have been disciplined for failure
to reveal their client's testimonial fraud or perjury under the present DR
7-102(B)(1) since it took effect in 1970. Telephone conversation with Harold Bar-
rick, General Chairman, The Advisory Committee, Missouri Bar Administra-
tion, August 6, 1979.
169. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 4-101(A). See
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 836-37 & nn.106-07.
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threaten, in some situations, the values that underlie the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. This follows because Disciplinary
Rule 7-102(B)(1), as amended, and Disciplinary Rule 4-101(A) offer pro-
tection only to information "gained in the professional relationship.' ' 70
This limitation might lead attorneys whose belief that their client had
committed perjury was based on information acquired before the profes-
sional relationship was formed to feel compelled to disclose the miscon-
duct. 7 1
A perhaps more significant reason for declining to follow the ABA's
lead with respect to Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) is the "serious anomaly"1 72
that has resulted from the ABA's failure to amend Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(2) when it amended Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1). Both the
Missouri and ABA version of Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(2) require "[a]
lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that . . . [a] person
other than his client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal [to]... promptly
reveal the fraud to the tribunal." As Professor Wolfram has pointed
out, 73 this rule appears to impose a duty on counsel to reveal testimonial
fraud by non-clients, even if in so doing the attorney must both (1) disclose
information from his client that is protected by the attorney-client
privilege, and (2) incriminate his client, for example, for suborning the
perjury of the non-client or as a fellow perjurer for testifying to the same
false story as the non-client. Thus, this version of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B)(2) poses a threat to the rights of clients under both the eviden-
tiary and fifth amendment privileges. Given these short-comings, Missouri
courts might be well advised to abandon Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B) en-
tirely.
B. A Compromise Course of Conduct for Missouri Attorneys
Assuming that Missouri courts are unlikely to reevaluate and to
change this Disciplinary Rule immediately, Missouri attorneys should con-
sider adopting a course of professional conduct that would do as little
violence as possible to the values that collide in the situation contemplated
by the Disciplinary Rule. Like Judge Hufstedler of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 174 this author believes that an advocate
should place his clients' rights and interests above his own desire to avoid
170. ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, EC 4-101(A).
171. This situation probably would occur very rarely. It is difficult to imagine
circumstances in which at least some of the information on which counsel would
rely in concluding that his client had lied was not "gained in the professional rela-
tionship."
172. Wolfram, supra note 1, at 864 n.214.
173. Id.
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professional sanctions. 1 7 5 A Missouri attorney who subscribes to that view
and who takes seriously the directive of Ethical Consideration 7-3 to
"resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law"' 78 should
not feel bound by the duty to disclose that Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1)
seeks to impose. 77 Instead, counsel should consider adopting the following
procedures.
At an appropriate time very early in the professional relationship, the
attorney should discuss with his client the current status of the law of
attorney-client privilege, self-incrimination and perjury. 178 In this discus-
sion, the lawyer should encourage his client to respond openly to inquiries
by his counsel and should energetically discourage his client from resorting
to perjury. The attorney also should explain the tactical difficulties per-
jury can generate and inform his client about the sanctions that can ac-
company being convicted of that crime.179
175. But see McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761-62 & n.2 (5th Cir.
1967).
176. Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, EC 7-3.
177. A Missouri attorney who decides to follow DR 7-102(B)(1) should feel
that full compliance with it requires disclosure only of his belief that his client has
committed fraud or perjury. The Disciplinary Rule commands counsel to reveal
only "the fraud," not the basis for the attorney's belief. If a court were to press
counsel to detail the basis for his conclusion, the attorney should ask the court to
formally order him to make these disclosures. Such an order presumably would
satisfy the requirements of DR 4-101(C)(2), which states: "A lawyer may reveal
[c]onfidences or secrets when.., required by law or court order."
There is authority for a court accepting counsel's representations about conclu-
sions that require counsel to withdraw. See Uhl v. Municipal Court, 37 Cal. App.
3d 526, 112 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1974) (involving court's acceptance of counsel's
representation that a conflict of interest required withdrawal from representation
of a criminal defendant). But see Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429,
434-35 (D.C. 1976) and notes 1-9 supra.
178. This, of course, is an application of the general duty of a lawyer "to form
and tell his client his real opinion as to everything the client should know, and to
advise him to do what he honestly believes to be in his best interest." H. DRINKER,
LEGAL ETHICS 102-03 (1953). See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
EC 7-7 ("In certain areas of legal representation not affecting the merits of the
cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to
make decisions of his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is ex-
clusively that of the client .... "); ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY,
EC 7-8 ("A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client
are made only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations.").
See also Cihlar, Client Self-Determination: Intervention or Interference? 14 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 604 (1970).
179. In Missouri, perjury is always a felony, but may fall within any one of
four classifications, depending upon the circumstances:
6. Perjury committed in any proceeding not involving a felony
charge is a class D felony.
7. Perjury committed in any proceeding involving a felony charge is
a class C felony unless:
(1) It is committed during a criminal trial for the pur-
pose of securing the conviction of an accused for
644 [Vol. 44
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If counsel subsequently receives information that leaves him absolute-
ly convinced that his client has committed fraud or perjury during the
course of the representation, both the loyalty that Canons 7 and 4180 give a
client the right to expect and common notions of decency dictate that the
attorney's first response should be to discuss the matter with his client. In
this discussion counsel should examine the support for his conclusion and
should give his client an opportunity to challenge it.
If this discussion does not dislodge counsel's conviction that fraud or
perjury has occurred, he should attempt to persuade his client to rectify
the fraud. It is important to acknowledge frankly that even if rectification
seems to be in the client's best interests, an attorney who attempts to per-
suade his client to rectify his fraud is pressuring his client to make poten-
tially self-incriminatory admissions and is doing so at least in part as an of-
ficer of the court.18 1 That kind of pressure from a representative of the
government threatens values which the fifth amendment privilege is in-
tended to help protect. Counsel's responsibility to help preserve the in-
tegrity of the judicial process,182 however, justifies the creation of that
threat, especially since its size can be minimized by the manner in which
the attorney attempts the persuasion and, frequently, by the availability of
a statutory defense to a prosecution for perjury. A Missouri attorney who is
encouraging his client to rectify alleged perjury always should discuss the
potential applicability of paragraph four of Mo. Rev. Stat. section
575.040. 183 If the client's perjury has not already been exposed, and if the
proceeding in which it occurred has not been terminated, this subsection
of section 575.040 makes retraction of the "false statement" a defense to a
perjury charge. The availability of this defense obviously could have a
murder, in which case it is a class A felony; or
(2) It is committed during a criminal trial for the purpose
of securing the conviction of an accused for any felony
except murder, in which case it is a class B felony.
RSMo §§ 575.040.6, .7 (1978).
The basic sentences of imprisonment for each class of felony are described in
RSMO § 558.011.1 (1978), which states in pertinent part:(1) For a class A felony, a term of years not less than ten years and
not to exceed thirty years, or life imprisonment;
(2) For a class B felony, a term of years not less than five years and
not to exceed fifteen years;(3) For a class C felony, a term of not to exceed five years [sic];
(4) For a class D felony, a term of years not to exceed five years ....
See also Wolfram, supra note 1, at 812-19, for a discussion of the risks posed to a
perjurer and to his attorney.
180. MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, Canons 7 & 4.
181. McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754, 761-62 (5th Cir. 1967).
182. See, e.g., MO. SUP. CT. R. 8.11, which sets forth the oath required for
Missouri attorneys on admission to the bar. The oath includes the following affir-
mation: "That I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided
to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek
to mislead the judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law ......
183. RSMo § 575.040.4 (1978). See note 76 and accompanying text supra.
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substantial impact on a client's decision about whether or not to rectify his
perjury.
At the same time he is encouraging his client to retract the false
testimony, counsel also should explain how he would respond if the fraud
were left unrectified. Specifically, the attorney should advise his client that
his Oath18 4 and the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibit a lawyer
from engaging in conduct that is dishonest, deceitful, or prejudicial to the
administration of justice, 185 as well as from knowingly using false evidence,
making a false statement of fact, or assisting a client in conduct the lawyer
knows to be illegal or fraudulent. 86 Counsel should make it clear that he
views the combined effect of these rules as prohibiting him from arguing
the perjured testimoney to the trier of fact or in any other way attempting
to use it to the client's advantage.1
87
184. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 8.11, supra note 181.
185. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 1-102(A)(4), (5).
186. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(A)(4), (5) & (7).
187. See ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, STANDARDS
RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION
[hereinafter cited as DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS], Defense Function § 7.7
(Approved Draft 1971). It states:
Testimony by the defendant.
(a) If the defendant has admitted to his lawyer facts which establish
guilt and the lawyer's independent investigation establishes that the ad-
missions are true but the defendant insists on his right to trial, the lawyer
must advise his client against taking the witness stand to testify falsely.
(b) If, before trial, the defendant insists that he will take the stand to
testify falsely, the lawyer must withdraw from the case, if that is feasible,
seeking leave of the court if necessary.
(c) If withdrawal from the case is not feasible or is not permitted by the
court, or if the situation arises during the trial and the defendant insists
upon testifying falsely in his own behalf, it is unprofessional conduct for
the lawyer to lend his aid to the perjury or the use of perjured testimony.
Before the defendant takes the stand in these circumstances, the lawyer
should make a record of the fact that the defendant is taking the stand
against the advice of counsel in some appropriate manner without
revealing the fact to the court. The lawyer must confine his examination
to identifying the witness as the defendant and permitting him to make
his statement to the trier or the triers of the facts; the lawyer may not
engage in direct examination of the defendant as a witness in the conven-
tional manner and may not later argue the defendant's known false ver-
sion offacts to the jury as worthy of belief and he may not recite or rely
upon the false testimony in his closing argument.
Id. at 167, 274-75, and Supp. 17-18 (emphasis added). However, the drafting
committee has clearly indicated that the attorney should not reveal his client's
conduct to the affected person or tribunal in a criminal case, stating its opinion
that: "It should be noted that DR 7-102(B)... is construed as not embracing the
giving of false testimony in a criminal case." Id. at Supp. 18.
See also Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730-31 (9th Cir. 1978); Burger,
Standards of Conduct: A Judge's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 12-13 (1966);
Wolfram, supra note 1, at 819-27, 862-63.
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If the client's alleged fraud or perjury occurs under circumstances in
which counsel could withdraw from the representation without unduly
prejudicing his client, the attorney also should inform the client that if the
fraud remains unrectified the attorney will be compelled to seek permis-
sion from the court to withdraw from the case. 18 8 Counsel should explain
that the Code of Professional Responsibility makes withdrawal mandatory
when it is obvious that an attorney's "continued employment will result in
a violation of a Disciplinary Rule' '189 and that he believes he would violate
the disciplinary rule which prohibits counsel from assisting clients in con-
duct the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent' 90 if he helped his client
present a case that was based in part on a material misrepresentation. 191
If the client remains unwilling to rectify his alleged fraud counsel
should evaluate the feasibility of withdrawing from the case. Even though
Disciplinary Rule 2-110(B)(2) 19 2 would appear to make withdrawal man-
datory in this situation, counsel's continuing obligation to avoid
188. See, e.g., Grievance Comm'n v. Malloy, 248 N.W.2d 43, 45-46 (N.D.
1976); In re A, 276 Or. 225, 236-40, 554 P.2d 479, 485-87 (1976) (citing OREGON
STATE BAR COMMITTEE ON LEGAL ETHICS, OPINION 277 (1972)); ABA COMM.
ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONS No. 287 (1953).
189. MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-110(B) provides in part:
A lawyer representing a client before a tribunal, with its permission if
required by its rules, shall withdraw from employment, and a lawyer
representing a client in other matters shall withdraw from employment,
if:
(2) He knows or it is obvious that his continued employment will result
in violation of a Disciplinary Rule.
190. MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-102(A)(7).
191. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 854-63, for a discussion of the arguments
for and against mandatory withdrawal in such a case. As Professor Wolfram
notes, there is some question whether the attorney's continuation in the case
would violate a Disciplinary Rule and thus bring DR 2-110(B)(2)'s mandatory
withdrawal requirement into play in this situation. Id. at 855. However, he also
observes that a mandatory withdrawal requirement would probably serve effec-
tively to reduce the incidence of uncorrected perjury, because "the specter of
mandatory withdrawal in most instances will give attorneys the additional
leverage that is required to [cause] . . . a recalcitrant client [to recant]." Id. at
857.
For similar problems arising in civil cases, cf. Hinds v. State Bar, 19 Cal. 2d 87,
119 P.2d 134 (1941) (attorney could have withdrawn after client's fraud); Com-
mittee on Professional Ethics v. Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298 (Iowa 1976) (no duty to
the client exists after the client has perjured himself); In re Malloy, 248 N.W.2d
43 (N.D. 1976) (if client commits perjury and refuses to recant, lawyer must re-
main silent and withdraw from the case); In re A, 276 Or. 225, 554 P.2d 479
(1976) (attorney should withdraw if client refuses to recant).
For the problems unique to criminal cases in such matters, cf. United States ex
rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977) (substitute counsel should
have bieen appointed before court allowed defense counsel to withdraw); State v.
Lowery, 111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974) (court indicated there was no mandate
that attorney withdraw after client's perjury in murder case).
192. MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-110(B)(2), set out in note 188 supra.
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intentionally damaging his client' 93 prohibits a withdrawal that would
significantly prejudice a client's rights or interests. 194 While counsel should
analyze several different factors when evaluating the propriety of attempt-
ing to withdraw, 195 the two most important considerations probably
are: (1) the juncture in the proceedings at which the alleged fraud was
193. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 7-101(A)(3), providing that: "A lawyer shall
not intentionally . .. [p]rejudice or damage his client during the course of the
professional relationship, except as required under DR 7-102(B)."
See also MO. SUP. CT. R. 4, EC 7-9, which provides:
In the exercise of his professional judgment on those decisions which
are for his determination in the handling of a legal matter, a lawyer
should always act in a manner consistent with the best interests of his
client. However, when an action in the best interest of his client seems to
him to be unjust, he may ask his client to forego such action.
194. See Mo. SuP. CT. R. 4, DR 2-110(A)(2), which states:
In any event, a lawyer shall not withdraw from employment until he has
taken reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable prejudice to the rights of his
client, including giving due notice to his client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, delivering to the client all papers and pro-
perty to which the client is entitled, and complying with applicable laws
and rules.
MO. SuP. CT. R. 4, EC 2-32, states:
A decision by a lawyer to withdraw should be made only on the basis of
compelling circumstances, and in a matter pending before a tribunal he
must comply with the rules of the tribunal regarding withdrawal. A
lawyer should not withdraw without considering carefully and endeavor-
ing to minimize the possible adverse effect on the rights of his client and
the possibility of prejudice to this client as a result of his withdrawal.
Even when he justifiably withdraws, a lawyer should protect the welfare
of his client....
However, Professor Wolfram indicates that withdrawal by the attorney may be
necesary at any stage of a civil proceeding, "[e]ven if the perjury occurs in the
midst of a deposition or a trial hearing." Wolfram, supra note 1, at 860 & n.196.
Further, Missouri cases indicate that although an attorney is charged with a
duty to his client, the attorney must nevertheless withdraw from the case if his
professional integrity will be compromised. See State v. Bersch, 276 Mo. 397,
406, 207 S.W. 809, 817 (1918) (arson case in which counsel withdrew after possi-
ble jury tampering by client); Harms v. Simkin, 322 S.W.2d 930, 933 (St. L. Mo.
App. 1959).
195. A useful analogy may be found in the situation of a lawyer who discovers
in the course of the proceedings that it will be necesary for him to testify in behalf
of his client. In the past, the venerable Canon 19 indicated that "a lawyer should
avoid testifying in behalf of his client," ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL AND
JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon 19, and today's Disciplinary Rules continue to
discourage the practice. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR
5-101, DR 5-102, EC 5-9, EC 5-10.
However, it has been persuasively argued that the attorney "need not (and in-
deed may not) withdraw upon becoming a witness if under the circumstances the
withdrawal is so late as to endanger unreasonably the client's case." Sutton, The
Testifying Advocate, 41 TEX. L. REV. 477, 485 & n.29 (1963). More recent
authority suggests that a real hardship to the client in retaining other counsel or a
long and extensive professional relationship with a client may outweigh the con-
siderations opposed to the attorney testifying without withdrawing. ABA FOR-
MAL OPINION 339 (1974).
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perpetrated, and (2) if the matter has reached the trial stage, whether the
trier of fact is a judge or a jury. If the alleged misconduct by the client oc-
curs well before trial is to commence (e.g., at an early discovery deposition)
the probability will be much greater that new counsel can be substituted
without significantly damaging the client's interests. By contrast, if the
client commits the alleged fraud on the stand during trial, withdrawal
thereafter by counsel might well cause a mistrial, 196 and clearly would im-
pose significant delays and time burdens on the client. Moreover, courts
are far less likely to grant permission to withdraw after the commencement
of trial than early in the pre-trial proceedings, at least in criminal cases. 197
If trial has begun and a judge is serving as trier of fact it may be virtual-
ly impossible for counsel to seek permission to withdraw without severely
damaging fundamental rights of his client. As the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently pointed out in Lowery v.
Cardwell, 198 an unexplained motion to withdraw that is presented shortly
after a client has testified is likely to communicate to the court the lawyer's
belief that his client has misrepresented the facts. According to the Lowery
opinion, an attorney who thus communicated his belief to the judge in a
bench trial would have effectively "disabled the fact finder from judging
the merits of the defendant's defense" and would have "openly placed
himself in opposition to his client upon her defense."' 99 The Lowery court
concluded that such conduct by counsel would "deprive the defendant of a
fair trial" and thereby violate his right under the fifth amendment to due
process of law. 20 0 Specially concurring, Judge Hufstedler added that in her
view such conduct by counsel also would violate the defendant's sixth
amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel. 20 1 It also might be
arguable that an infelicitously timed or phrased motion to withdraw whose
obvious effect was to communicate to the trier of fact the attorney's belief
that his client had perjured himself would violate some of the values and
policies which underlie the constitutional and statutory privilege against
.self-incrimination.
Considerations such as these should make attorneys extremely reluc-
tant to request permission to withdraw in court-tried matters. In those rare
bench trials where a motion to withdraw would be appropriate, counsel
should present the motion in a discreet form and at an inconspicous junc-
ture-not immediately after his client has testified. Counsel also should
studiously avoid detailing the grounds upon which his request is based.
196. See, e.g., McKissick v. United States, 379 F.2d 754 (5th Cir. 1967).
197. See Wolfram, supra note 1, at 860-61. See also, e.g., State v. Lowery,
111 Ariz. 26, 523 P.2d 54 (1974); People v. Glover, 270 Cal. App. 2d 255, 75 Cal.
Rptr. 629 (1969); Lamb v. State, 488 P.2d 1295 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (folly to
allow withdrawal of counsel at late state of trial).
198. 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
199. Id. at 730.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 732 (Hufstedler, J., specially concurring).
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Realistically, it is unlikely that trial judges to whom such motions are
presented will respond favorably. In addition to the obvious concerns they
will have about wasting the limited resources of the judicial system, such
judges also must try to identify and frustrate intentional (and bad faith) ef-
forts by counsel to abort trials that their clients appear to be losing. 202
When a motion to withdraw would be inappropriate or has been
denied, an attorney who believes his client has testified falsely must con-
tinue the representation. In so doing, he must navigate a narrow course
between depriving his client of due process and effective assistance of
counsel, on the one hand, and, on the other, actively helping his client
capitalize on the alleged fraud or perjury. While it would violate fun-
damental rights of the client for counsel to retreat, after the fraudulent
testimony, into a patently unprofessional and passive role, it would do
great violence to the integrity of the judicial process for counsel to ag-
gressively "argue [his client's] known false version of the facts to the jury as
worthy of belief' or to "recite or rely upon the false testimony in his closing
argument. ,203 Obviously some form of uneasy compromise will have to be
made. While doing his best to avoid referring to or reinforcing the per-
jured testimony, counsel should introduce, and argue vigorously to the
trier of fact, all the evidence which he has concluded is not fraudulent.
The "solution" proposed here should leave no one fully satisifed.
Because of the inescapable conflict between basic values that is created
when a lawyer firmly believes his client has testified falsely, a solution that
completely secured one set of interests could be achieved only at the cost of
wholesale abandonment of others. It is the hallmark of a civilized system of
justice that it is unwilling to pay that high a cost.
202. Id. at 731 n.6.
203. DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARDS § 7.7(c). See id. at 275-77 for the draft-
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